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THE REVENUE ACT OF 1942
By HENRY ROTTSCHAEFER*
T HE part of the public which has thus far borne the bulk of
federal taxes since the adoption of the Sixteenth Amendment
has become accustomed to the appearance of a new revenue law
about every second year. There have been few revenue laws that
have made such important changes in measuring the federal tax-
payer's liability as the Revenue Act of 1942. The sharp decrease in
the individual's credits against net income is expected to add
millions to the class of those liable to federal income taxation. This
alone would justify an exposition of the important changes made
by the latest Revenue Act. There are, however, additional reasons
of considerable importance for such exposition. Long hallowed
principles for computing federal estate and gift taxes have been
etensively modified. It is the purpose of the following discussion
to survey the more important amendments of the Internal Revenue
Code' made by the Revenue Act of 1942.2 Its scope will be limited
to those changes that affect the estate tax, the gift tax, and the
income tax. The changes will, whenever necessary, be discussed
against the background of the prior law as found not only in the
earlier Revenue Acts and the Internal Revenue Code but also
in their administrative and judicial interpretations and applications.
THE ESTATE TAX
The amendments made to the estate tax provisions of the
I.R.C. are expressly made "applicable only with respect to de-
cedents dying after the date of the enactment" of R. A. 1942,
'-Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'The Internal Revenue Code will be designated hereinafter as I.R.C.
"The Revenue Act of 1942 will be designated hereinafter as R. A. 1942.
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except as otherwise expressly provided.- The date of the enact-
ment of R. A. 1942 is October 21, 1942. The principal changes
relate to (a) inclusions in the gross estate, (b) deductions from
the gross estate in arriving at the net estate, and (c) credits
against the tax. These will be discussed in that order.
Powers of Appointment
The estate tax was introduced into the existing federal tax
system in 1916. The first Act did not expressly include in a
decedent's gross estate the property with respect to which he
had at the time of his death a power of appointment, nor property
passing under his exercise of any such power. An early attempt
to include therein property passing under a decedent's exercise by
will of a general power held by him failed. The Supreme Court
took the position that the donee of a power of appointment, even
a general power, had no estate in the property with respect to
which he held such a power.4 The defect was remedied by the
Revenue Act of 1918. This required the inclusion in a decedent's
gross estate of property passing under a general power of appoint-
ment exercised by decedent by -will or by certain kinds of inter
vivos transfers of a testamentary character. Later amendments
merely added other classes of inter vivos transfers to those speci-
fied in the 1918 Act. The provision became a part of the I.R.C. in
this amended form in 1939.
There were three conditions that had to be satisfied if property
with respect to which a decedent held a power of appointment were
to be included in his gross estate. The power had to be a gener4l
power, and what was a general power was a question of federal
law.5 Second, the power had to be exercised by the decedent by
one of the methods specified in the statute. Lastly, the property
had to pass as a result of his exercise of the power. 6 The donor
of a power could effectually prevent the property from being
included in the gross estate of the donee by conferring a special
power upon him. A donee, content to have the property pass to
those who would take in default of his exercise of his power,
could reduce his estate tax by refusing to exercise any general
3R. A. 1942, see. 401.
4United States v. Field, (1021) 255 U. S. 257, 41 S. Ct. 256, 65 L. Ed.
617.
'Morgan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (1940) 309 U. S. 78,
60 S. Ct. 424, 84 L. Ed. 585.
6Helvering v. Grinnell, (1935) 294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354, 79 L. Ed.
825; Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., (1942) 316 U. S. 56, 62 S. Ct.
925, 86 L. Ed. 1266.
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power held by him. Even his exercise of it would not bring the
property within his gross estate to the extent that the effect of his
exercise thereof resulted in the same disposition of the property
that would have occurred had he not exercised it.7 The possibilities
for reducing the frequency with which a given property would
enter into the computation of some decedent's federal estate
tax that these limitations afforded went unnoticed by neither tax-
payers nor tax gatherers.$ The amendments made by R. A. 19421
are the Treasury's response to that situation.
The first important change relates to the kind of powers whose
possession, exercise, or release, entails tax consequences. It is no
longer necessary that the power be general. The test is whether
it is exercisable by the decedent alone or in conjunction with any
person. There are certain powers which a decedent may possess,
exercise, or release without subjecting the property to which they
relate to inclusion within his gross estate. If he is limited to ap-
pointing persons belonging to a class including only his spouse,
the spouse of the creator of the power, descendants of the decedent
or his spouse, descendants (other than the decedent) of the creator
of the power or his spouse, spouses of such descendants, or donees
devises or bequests to whom are deductible in computing the
decedent's net estate, the power has no significance for estate tax
purposes. The same applies where the decedent did not receive
from the creator of the power any vested or contingent beneficial
interest in the property subject to the power, "or did not there-
after acquire any such interest." The significance of the quoted
part is not wholly clear. It undoubtedly refers to the decedent's
acquisition of a beneficial interest in the property by a transaction
subsequent to the creation of the power. It is also practically
certain that it refers only to donative acquisitions. It is probable,
but not certain, that it refers only to cases in which the decedent's
subsequent acquisition of such beneficial interest is from the
creator of the power. It is also essential to the exclusion of such
power from the statutory definition of powers of appointment
that it be one to appoint within a "restricted class." The statute
gives no clue as to what will be held to constitute a "restricted
7Helvering v. Grinnell, (1935) 294 U. S. 153, 55 S. Ct. 354, 79 L. Ed.
825.
'See E. N. Griswold, Powers of Appointment and the Federal Estate
Tax, (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 929; D. M. Schuyler, Powers of Appoint-
ment and Especially Special Powers: The Estate Taxpayer's Last Stand,
(1939) 33 Ill. L. Rev. 771.
OR. A. 1942, sec. 403(a).
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class." It is practically certain that it will cover a class which in-
cludes only such members as are specifically enumerated in defin-
ing the other class of excludible powers. It is also probable that
it covers classes whose members are defined by a factor other
than family relationship to either the creator of the power or the
decedent. In any event the requirement will be satisfied if the
decedent has the power to appoint within a class no broader than
the members of the creator's family and his or their spouses and
descendants. Judicial decision alone can resolve doubts as to when
a power will be deemed to be one to appoint within a "restricted
class." There is one further test for excluding such a power from
taxable powers of appointment. It must not be "exercisable to
any extent for the benefit of the decedent, his estate, his creditors,
or the creditors of his estate." The effect of making it exercisable
to any extent for the benefit of any of these four classes makes
it a power whose possession, exercise, or release would render all
the property subject to the power includible in the decedent's
gross estate, not merely that part thereof which decedent could
divert to the defined-classes. Furthermore, the decisive factor is
the decedent's privilege of exercising the power in that manner,
not the fact that he does so exercise it.
The exemption from the class of taxable powers of the two
classes of powers last considered is a privilege that is lost to the
extent that the decedent exercises his power by creating another
power to appoint. Assume, for example, that A devises and be-
queaths property to B for B's life, with power in B by will to
appoint within a class including only descendants of A. If on
B's death he exercises the power properly, the property subject
to the power is not includible in his gross estate. If, however,
B dies and by his will exercises his power by devising and be-
queathing the property to C, a descendant of A, for C's life, with
power to appoint by will within a class including only descendants
of A, then the value of the property subject to C's power is in-
cludible in B's gross estate. It is immaterial that C's power of
appointment belongs in one of the exempted classes. Had B
exercised his power by giving C the whole remainder interest in
half of the property, and a life estate in the remaining half with
power to appoint by will within a class including only descendants
of A, the value of the latter half of the property would be includible
in B's gross estate. The net result is a drastic reduction in the
efficiency of powers of appointment as a device for reducing federal
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estate taxes over a period involving successive transfers of
property. It should be noted that the value at which the property
subject to the power created by B enters his gross estate is its
value undiminished by any precedent or subsequent interest not
subject to such power to appoint. That would mean, in the case
of the above example, its value at the date of B's death (or as of
the optional valuation date if B's executor chose that date)
undiminished by the present value of C's life estate as of the
same date.
The second important change affecting powers of appointment
abolishes the prior rule that property subject to a power is in-
cludible in a decedent's gross estate only to the extent that it passes
by his exercise thereof. It is now merely necessary that he have-
the power at the time of his death. This puts the federal provision
in line with that in the inheritance tax laws of many states under
which a failure to exercise a power effects a taxable transfer as
much as does an exercise thereof. To prevent the development of
certain avoidance devices the new Act provides that a power shall
le considered to exist on the date of decedent's death even in
cases in which it is exercisable only on giving notice thereof
whether or not such notice has been given on or before said date,
and also in cases in which its exercise takes effect only after
the expiration of a stated period thereafter whether or not it was
exercised before said date. The prior law included property sub-
ject to a power in a decedent's gross estate if it passedas a result
of his exercise thereof by will or certain types of inter vivos trans-
fers of a testamentary character. The amended provision includes
property in the gross estate if the decedent has exercised or re-
leased a power with respect thereto by the same types of inter
vivos transfers as were described in the provision prior to its
amendment.
The new Act contains several provisions intended to give limited
protection to certain classes of powers created before October 21,
1942. The amendments made by R. A. 1942 apply to them only
if the power is exercised after that date. This means that property
subject to a general power created before that date is includible
in decedent's gross estate only if exercised subsequent thereto.
The property need not. however, pass under its exercise, and in
that respect the rule differs from what it would have been bad
the law remained unamended. The provision has further con-
sequences. Property subject to a special power created prior to
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October 21, 1942, also enters decedent's gross estate, but only if
the power is exercised after that date. Such property would not
have entered his gross estate had the law remained unamended.
The exemption from the application of the amendments does not
extend to a power exercisable in favor of the decedent, his estate,
his creditors, or the creditors of his estate. However, even as to
it, the amendments become applicable, in cases in which the donee
is under a legal disability to release it on that date, six months
after the termination of such disability. A person in the military
or naval forces of the United States 10 is considered to be under
such disability until the termination of the present war. The effect
of this provision is to postpone the time when such power becomes
subject to the amendments. It does not keep the prior law
permanently in force as to it. However, a way is left open to
enable every donee of a power created prior to October 21, 1942,
to avoid the effects of the amendments upon his gross estate. This
requires him to release the power within a prescribed period. That
period expired on December 31, 1942, with respect to all powers
except those exercisable in favor of decedent, his estate, his credi-
tors, or the creditors of his estate, where the donees were under
a legal disability to release them on October 21, 1942. In the
excepted cases the release must be effected within six months after
the termination of the disability. Furthermore, the amendments
are expressly made inapplicable to powers created prior to October
21, 1942, if the donee dies prior to January 1, 1943, or, in the cases
to which applicable, within six months after the termination of his
legal disability to release the power. That is, the escape period
is the same whether death of the donee or his release of the
power be the generating cause of his avoidance of the effects of the
amendments upon his gross estate. It should be noted that R. A.
1942, expressly provides that the release of a power to appoint
before January 1, 1943, shall not be deemed a gift of the property
subject to the power, and that said amendment shall apply to all
calendar years prior to 1943.11 No comparable change is made
to take care of those who benefit from the extended period for
releasing a power because they were. on October 21. 1942. under
a legal disability to release it.
10R. A. 1942, sec. 511, amends I.R.C., sec. 3797(a) (15) to read as fol-
lows: "The term 'military or naval forces of the United States' includes the
Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Army Nurse Corps, Female, the Worn-
en's Army Auxiliary Corps, the Navy Nurse Corps, Female, and the
W¥omen's Reserve branch of the Naval Reserve."
11R. A. 1942, sec. 452(c).
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Insurance Proceeds
The 1916 Estate Tax Act contained no express provision deal-
ing with the treatment of the proceeds of insurance policies payable
by reason of the insured's death. The 1918 Act remedied this
omission by requiring the inclusion in a decedent's gross estate
of "the amount receivable by the executor as insurance under
policies taken out by the decedent upon his own life; and to the
extent of the excess over $40,000 of the amount receivable by all
other beneficiaries as insurance under policies taken out by the
decedent upon his own life." It was incorporated in the I.R.C.
in 1939 in this very same form.12 The changes made by R. A.
1942 are the first since the provision was introduced into the
federal estate tax system.'- The rule applicable where the insur-
ance is payable to the insure d's executor is left as before. The clue
to the amendments is to be found in the confusion that grew
out of administrative and judicial attempts to determine when
insurance had been "taken out by the decedent upon his own life."
Space limitations prevent any adequate review of these attempts.
It is sufficient for present purposes to state that the tests applied
at various times by the Treasury, and sustained by the courts as
valid interpretations of the statutory language, were first the pay-
ment of premiums, later the acquisition and possession at death
of any incidents of ownership, and finally a return to the first of
them although in a somewhat modified form. 14 The new provi-
sions conform most nearly to the principles stated in Treasury
Decision 5032.
The amended provision' 5 specifies two alternative grounds for
including in a decedent's gross estate amounts receivable by
others than his executor as insurance under policies upon his life.
Such amounts are so includible, either in whole or in part, if the
policies were purchased with premiums, or other consideration,
paid directly or indirectly by him. The second basis for inclusion
is his possession at death of any of the incidents of ownership
exercisable alone or in conjunction with any other person. It is
22I.R.C., sec. 811(g).
l-For general discussions, see 0. K. Fraenkel, Federal Taxation of Life
Insurance Policies, (1935) 5 Brooklyn L. Rev. 140; Note, Federal Taxation
of Life Insurance, (1941) 40 Mich. L. Rev. 1221; R. E. Paul, Life Insur-
ance and the Federal Estate Tax, (1938) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1037; M. R.
Schlesinger, Taxes and Insurance, (1941) 55 Harv. L. Rev. 226.
"See Treasury Decision 5032, issued on January 10, 1941, amending
Reg. 80, Articles 25. 26, and 27, (1942) 36 Treasury Decisions Internal
Revenue 15.5R. A. 1942, sec. 404(a).
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clear, therefore, that insurance proceeds receivable by third party
beneficiaries under a policy on decedent's life may constitute a
part of his gross estate even though he has completely divested
himself of all interest in the policy prior to his death. In such case,
however, the inclusion will have to be based on his payment of
premiums, or other consideration, and the amount includible will
have to be computed in accordance with the rules applicable to
such case. It is equally clear that insurance proceeds receivable
by third party beneficiaries under a policy on decedent's life may
constitute a part of his gross estate though he has paid no part of
the premiums thereon. It is only necessary that he possess at death
an incident of ownership. In such case the amount includible in
his gross estate would equal the entire proceeds. A mixed case
would occur where the decedent has paid part or all of the
premiums and also retained until deith one or more incidents of
ownership. The proceeds would clearly be a part of his gross
estate. If he had paid all the premiums the entire proceeds would
be includible therein. But, if he had paid part only of the premiums,
a question would arise as to how much of the proceeds would be
so includible. Since the only reference to apportioning the proceeds
occurs in that part of the amendment dealing with the inclusion
of the proceeds on the basis of decedent's payment of premiums or
other consideration, it is quite likely that the apportionment
formula will be held inapplicable where the inclusion of the pro-
ceeds can be based on the decedent's retention of an interest in the
policy until his death. It is, accordingly, likely that in such case the
whole proceeds will be held to constitute a part of his gross estate.
It should be noted in passing that the amendment expressly ex-
cludes a reversionary interest from incidents of ownership. This
settles, in favor of the taxpayer, the attempt to apply to this prob-
lem the theory of Helvering v. Hallock.'
The new provision contains very explicit provisions for com-
puting the amount to be included in a decedent's gross estate
where the sole basis for the inclusion is his payment of premiums,
or other consideration. The amount then includible is in the pro-
portion that the amount paid by him bears to the total premiums
paid for the insurance. Thus, if he paid half of the premiums, half
of the proceeds would be includible in his gross estate. The
amount paid by him may, however, consist of something more than,
1(1940) 309 U. S. 106, 60 S. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604. The cases applying
its theory to insurance include Bailey v. U. S., (1940) 31 Fed. Supp. 778;
C. of I. R. v. Washer, (1942) 127 Fed. (2d) 446.
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or other than, the premiums paid by him. Assume a policy taken
out on decedent's life by his wife who pays the premiums out of
her own funds for 10 years. Thereafter the insured takes over
the policy and reimburses his wife to the extent of x dollars. The
x dollars would become a part of the amount paid by him to
purchase the policy. The new law provides for an adjustment in
computing the amount deemed paid by decedent where he trans-
fers the policy. This probably means a transfer completely divest-
ing him of all interest in the policy, or in such part thereof as
he is transferring. Any other type of transfer would leave in him
an incident of ownership requiring the inclusion of the proceeds in
his gross estate on that basis alone. The significance of a transfer
also depends upon whether or not it is donative. If decedent
transfers a policy on his life, on which he has been paying pre-
miums, to his creditors, and if such transfer is wholly without
donative intent, the proceeds thereof do not enter his gross estate
even in proportion to the premiums paid by him. If, however, he
transfers it by way of gift and receives no consideration whatever,
the proceeds enter his gross estate in proportion to the premiums
paid by him. If the policy were a fully paid policy at the time of
the gift, the entire proceeds would be includible in his gross estate.
In applying these principles a transfer is deemed a gift, in whole
or in part, if and to the extent that it is such under the gift tax
provisions of the I.R.C. (or would have been such had said chapter
been in force when the transfer was made). That chapter treats
the transfer of property for less than an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth as a gift in an amount equal
to the excess of the value of the transferred property over the con-
sideration received by the transferor. If decedent makes a donative
transfer of a policy on his life in this manner, the amount that has
to be included in his gross estate is adjusted to reflect the fact that
the consideration received by him reduces his contribution to the
production of the asset represented by the insurance proceeds. This
is accomplished by reducing the amount deemed paid by him in
computing the proportionate part of the proceeds includible in
decedent's gross estate.
Let A -the amount actually paid by decedent prior to the
transfer of the policy, and assume that he made no
further payments; and
Let C --the consideration received by him for the transfer;
and
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Let V = the value of the policy at date of its transfer; and
Let R = amount by which A is to be reduced; and
Let P = amount deemed paid by decedent in computing the
proportionate part of the proceeds includible in his
gross estate.
The statutory formulae then are as follows:
(1) P=A-R
C
(2) R =--(A)
V
C C
(3) Hence, P=A--(A)=A(1--).
V V
A concrete illustration will help to clarify the formulae. Assume
that decedent (D) took out a policy on his life on February 1,
1941, for $5,000; that he transferred this policy to B on February
10, 1943, for $25; that on that date the value of the policy was
$300; that the premiums paid by decedent prior to the transfer
amounted to $600; and that he dies on March 1, 1944, the trans-
feree in the meantime having paid $200 additional premiums.
.The question is how much of the $5,000 proceeds received by B
are to be includible in D's gross estate. The statutory formula
(not one of those set forth above) requires computing the amount
deemed paid by D. In the formulae set forth A = $600; C = $25 ;
and V $300. Substituting those values in formula 3 (the
formula aimed at), we obtain the result P --$550. The statute
provides that the part of the $5,000 to be included in D's gross
estate shall equal that proportion thereof which the amounts paid
by D ($550) bears to the total premiums paid for the insurance
(in this instance $600 paid by D plus $200 paid by B, equal to
$800). Hence 550/800ths of $5,000, or $3,437.50.
There are two other provisions that must be followed in
computing the amount paid by decedent in determining the propor-
tion of the proceeds includible in his gross estate. The first pro-
vides a special rule therefor where the premiums or other
consideration are property held as community property by the
insured and the surviving spouse. 17 The second is of more general
interest, and reflects the changes made in Reg. 80, Articles 25, 26,
and 27, by T. D. 5032. It provides that, in computing the propor-
tion of the premiums or other consideration paid by decedent (but
not in computing the total premiums paid), the amount paid by
decedent on or before January 10, 1941 (the date of T. D. 5032)
17I.R.C., sec. 811(g), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 404(a).
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is to be excluded if decedent never possessed an incident of
ownership in the policy after that date. This rule is inapplicable
if decedent possessed any incidents of ownership after that date,
even though he may have relinquished all of them prior to his
death.
Another important change eliminates an advantage heretofore
accruing to decedents dying with insurance payable to third party
beneficiaries. The prior law excluded $40,000 of the proceeds of
such insurance from the gross estate. This has been completely
eliminated. The entire proceeds of such insurance, if meeting any
of the tests of inclusion heretofore considered, are now includible
in the gross estate.
The amendments are expressly made applicable only to estates
of decedents dying after October 21, 1942.
Other Inclusions in Gross Estate
The provisions of the I.R.C. dealing with inter vivos transfers
and joint interests have been amended with respect to property
held as community property by a decedent and his surviving
spouse It is sufficient for our purposes merely to call attention
to this matter. 18
Deductions
The federal estate tax has from its inception been based on the
net estate. This has always been defined as the gross estate less
certain deductions. The deductions under the I.R.C. in computing
the basic estate tax have differed from those permitted to be taken
in computing the additional estate tax with respect to the deduc-
tion for the specific exemption. No change has been made in this
for purposes of the basic tax. The deduction therefor in computing
the additional tax has been increased from $40,000 to $60,000.19
This seeming favor to taxpayers is, however, more than cancelled
for some of them by the elimination of $40,000 of insurance pro-
ceeds receivable by third party beneficiaries from exclusions from
the gross estate. Another change grants the estates of non-residents
who are not citizens of the United States an exemption of $2,000.20
This is the first time they have been accorded this deduction. It is
available in computing both the basic tax and the additional tax.
The permissible deductions have always included such amounts
as were allowed by the laws of the jurisdiction under which the
11I.R.C., sec. 811(d), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 402(a); I.R.C.
sec. 811(e), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 402(b).
1 I.R.C., sec. 935(c), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 414(a).
2oI.R.C., sec. 861 (a), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 412(a).
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estate was being administered for funeral expenses, administra-
tion expenses, claims against the estate, unpaid mortgages upon
property included in the gross estate, and maintenance of depen-
dents during the period of administration. It was not limited to
the value of the property includible in the gross estate and which
could be resorted to to pay or satisfy those items of deduction.
The result was that the deduction often inured to the benefit of
those receiving property includible in the gross estate but not
subject to those claims. If, for example, A died leaving a gross
estate of $200,000 of property subject to such claims and $400,-
000 worth of insurance includible in his gross estate, and if the
total deductions of the character described above were $300,000,
then the allowable deduction was $300,000, although but $200,000
of them would in fact be paid.2 1 This has been changed to limit the
deduction to an amount equal to the value of the property includible
in the gross estate which, or the avails of which, would, under the
applicable law, bear the burden of the payment of such deductions
in the final adjustment and settlement of the estate. The value of
such property must also be first reduced by the deduction, attribut-
able to such property, because of uncompensated losses incurred
during the settlement of the estate arising from fires, storms, ship-
wrecks, or other casualties..2 2 The result is to limit this class of de-
ductions to the amount that can be actually satisfied out of the
assets of the estate legally applicable to their discharge.
There have been several changes made involving amounts of
a decedent's estate applied to religious, educational, charitable,
etc., purposes of the kind defined in I.R.C., Sections 812 (d) and
861 (a) (3). It has been held that a decedent's pledge to an
educational institution which remained unpaid at the date of his
death was not deductible as a claim against his estate since it
was not contracted for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth.2 3 This has now been changed by per-
mitting the deduction of a claim founded upon a promise or
agreement of decedent to make a contribution or gift to a donee
described in Section 812 (d) for the purposes therein specified,
limited to the extent that it would be allowable if the promise or
agreement constituted a bequest.2 4 A comparable change is made
21See Helvering v. N. W. National Bank & Trust Co., (1937) 89 Fed.
(2d) 553.
22I.R.C., sec. 812(b), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 405(a)2 2Taft v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, (1938) 304 U. S. 351, 58
S. Ct. 891, 82 L. Ed. 1393.
241.R.C., sec. 812(b), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 406(a).
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in the case of estates of non-residents who are not citizens of the
United States.2 ' The provisions governing deductions for trans-
fers for public, charitable and religious uses, in the case of both
citizens and residents of the United States and of non-residents
who are not such citizens, have been amended to include among
such deductions property includible in the gross estate under the
amended provisions" as to powers of appointment where such prop-
perty is received by a donee bequests to whom would be deduc-
tible.2 1' It is not necessary that the decedent exercise his power
by appointing such donee. The same result occurs where such
donee receives it on decedent's failure to appoint. Furthermore,
amounts that pass to such donees as the result of an irrevocable
disclaimer of a bequest, legacy, devise, transfer or power, are
deductible if the disclaimer is made prior to the date prescribed
for filing the estate tax return.27 This is probably no more than
declaratory of existing law.2- The last change expressly conditions
the right to take these charitable, etc, deductions on the factor
that no substantial part of the activities of certain specified classes
of donees consist of carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempt-
ing, to influence legislation."' A similar condition had already
been imposed by the Revenue Act of 1934 with respect to the
other classes of donees to whom deductible transfers may be
made.
The prior provisions governing the deduction for property pre-
viously taxed have been considerably amended. Some of the amend-
ments reflect the changes made in the treatment of powers of
appointment under both the estate tax and the gift tax, and of
deductions under I.R.C., Sections 812(b) and 861 (a) (1). There
have also been changes in the conditions imposed upon the allow-
ance of this deduction. The I.R.C. required the final determina-
tion and payment by the estate of the prior decedent of any
estate tax due under the basic estate tax sub-chapter, the Revenue
Act of 1926, or any prior Act of Congress. A brief r6sum6 of
the development of our present estate tax system is necessary
for understanding the scope of the changes. The 1926 Act im-
2 I.R.C., sec. 861(a) (1), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 406(b).
21I.R.C., sec. 812(d), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 403(b) (1) I.R.C.,
sec. 861(a) (3), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 403(b) (2).
271.R.C., sec. 812(d), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 408(a) ; I.R.C.,
scc. 861 (a) (3), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 408(b).
2SSee Com'r of Internal Revenue v. First Natl. Bank of Atlanta. (1939)
102 Fed. (2d) 129; Humphrey v. Millard, (1935) 79 Fed. (2d) 107.
"DI.R.C., sec. 812(d), as amended by R.A. 1942, sec. 409(a) ; I.R.C.,
sec. 861 (a) (3), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 409(b).
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posed what is now called the basic tax. The 1932 Act first im-
posed what is now called the additional estate tax. When the
latter was enacted no change was made in those provisions of
the 1926 Act providing for the deduction for property previously
taxed. Hence, payment of the estate tax imposed by the 1926 Act
continued to be a condition precedent to the allowance of this
deduction. However, a person dying after the enactment of the
1932 Act might have to pay the additional tax imposed by the
1932 Act but no tax under the 1926 Act. Assume A to be such
a person whose property was bequeathed to B. If B died while
the 1932 Act was in effect, or while the I.R.C. in its unamended
form was in effect, his estate would be unable to take this de-
duction with respect to property acquired by B from A, since it
could not meet the condition that the tax due from A's estate
under the 1926 Act had been paid. Furthermore, if A be assumed
to have died after the enactment of the I.R.C., his estate might
have had to pay a tax only under the additional estate tax sub-
chapter of the I.R.C. If (assuming that to be the case) B died
while the I.R.C. was in its unamended form, his estate would
equally be denied this deduction because it could not meet the
condition that A's estate have paid the tax due under the basic
estate tax subchapter of the I.R.C. All this has now been changed.
To meet the case in which the prior decedent died after the enact-
ment of the 1932 Act but prior to the enactment of the I.R.C.,
the 1926 Act was amended. 30 The amendment is made applicable
to the estates of all decedents dying after the enactment of the
1932 Act, regardless of whether they died before or after the en-
actment of the I.R.C.3 1 The decedents referred to in the preceding
sentence are those who acquired property from the prior dece-
dent referred to in the sec ond preceding sentence. To meet the
case in which the prior decedent died while the I.R.C. was in its
unamended form, the amendments to it are made applicable to the
estates of all decedents dying after its enactment (February 10,
1939). 2 The result is that many estates of persons dying after
the enactment of the 1932 Act may have made overpayments of
their tax. They are given a, right to a refund or credit therefor,
but claims for refund or credit must be made prior to October 21,
1943.33
30R. A. 1926, secs. 303(a)(2) and 303(b)(2), as amended by R. A.
1942, sec. 407(b).
31R. A. 1942, sec. 407(c)(4).
32R. A. 1942, see. 407(c) (1), (2), (3).
33R. A. 1942, sec. 407(d).
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Credits Against the Tax
The amendments change only the provisions involving the
credits against the basic estate tax. The credit for gift taxes paid
under the Revenue Act of 1924 is now to be applied against the
basic estate tax after deducting therefrom the credit for state
death taxes.34  The limit on the credits for gift taxes paid
under the Revenue Act of 1932 or the gift tax chapter of the
I.R.C., so far as it depended on the amount of the basic estate
tax, is now made to depend upon that tax after deducting there-
from the credits for gift taxes paid under the 1924 Act and for state
death taxes."- Finally the 80 per cent limit on the credit for state
death taxes is now to be based on the basic estate tax before de-
ducting therefrom the credits for federal gift taxes instead of
after deducting the credit for federal gift taxes paid under the
1932 Act or the gift tax chapter of the I.R.C. 6 The net effect of
these changes is to increase the value of the credit for state death
taxes wherever an estate is also entitled to gift tax credits.
General Provisions
Attention is directed to the changes in I.R.C., Section 826
(dealing with the collection of unpaid taxes). The first of these
reflects changes made in the treatment of insurance proceeds2 7
The second permits an executor to recover a proportionate part
of the tax from those receiving property includible in a decedent's
gross estate under the amended provisions dealing with powers
of appointment.s Section 827 (liens for taxes) has also been
amended."
THE GIFT TAX
The changes made in the gift tax provisions of the I.R.C. can
be disposed of rather briefly.
Taxable Gifts
Two new provisions have been added in defining taxable gifts.
One provides that gifts of property held as community property
are to be considered as gifts of the husband unless shown to be
attributable to the wife's personal earnings or separate property.40
81I.R.C., sec. 813(a) (1), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 410(a).
1.R.C., sec. 813(a) (2) (A), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 410(b).
313I.R.C., sec. 813(b), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 410(c).
371.R.C., see. 826(c), as amended by R. A. 1942, secs. 404(b) and
414(b).
38I.R.C., sec. 826(d), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 403(c).
:9I.R.C., sec. 827(b), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 411(a) ; see also
I.R.C., see. 900, as amended by R. A. 1942, see. 411 (b).
40I.R.C., sec. 1000(d), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 453.
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The other is of more general importance. It provides that the ex-
ercise or release of a power of appointment is to be deemed a
transfer of property by the person possessing the power. The
term "power of appointment" has the same meaning as in the
estate tax chapter of the I.R.C. as amended by R. A. 1942.41 The
treatment of powers created prior to October 22, 1942, is similar
to that given such powers by the amendments relating to the
estate tax.
42
Exchsions from Gifts
The federal gift tax act of 1932 and the gift tax chapter of the
I.R.C. have always excluded from gross gifts a limited portion of
gifts made to any person during a given year. The amount thereof
has been steadily decreased from $5000 to $3000, the amount ap-
plicable to the calendar year 1943 and subsequent calendar years,13
Gifts of future interests in property have never been permitted to
be excluded from gross gifts, and this principle is continued with
respect to 1943 and subsequent calendar years. Prior to the calen-
dar year 1939, a gift in trust did not lose the right to be excluded
merely because it was one in trust,44 and it was decided that in the
case of such gifts the beneficiaries, and not the trustee, were the
donees. 45 This is still the rule applicable in computing gifts for
years prior to 1939. The rule was, however, changed by denying
such gifts the right of exclusion, and this changed rule remained
in force during the period from January 1, 1939, through Decem-
ber 31, 1942. It applies under the amendments now made to gifts
made during any calendar year within that period.46 However, in
computing gross gifts for the calendar year 1943 and subsequent
calendar years a gift in trust does not lose its right of exclusion
merely because it is such.4 7 The discrimination against gifts in
trust that existed during the calendar years 1939 through 1942
has thus been removed.
Deductions
The only change involves the specific exemption .4 This has
been reduced from $40,000 to $30,000. This amount is to be used
41I.R.C., sec. 1000(c), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 452(a).
42R. A. 1942, sec. 452(b).
S3I.R.C., sec. 1003(b)(3), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 454.
4I.R.C., sec. 1003(b) (1).
45Helvering v. Hutchings, (1941) 312 U. S. 393, 61 S. Ct. 653, 85 L.
Ed. 909.
46I.R.C., sec. 1003(b) (2), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 454.
47I.R.C., sec. 1003(b) (3), added by R. A. 1942, see. 454.
48I.R.C., sec. 1004, as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 455.
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in all computations required to be made to arrive at the tax due
for the calendar year 1943 and subsequent calendar years. Hence
in computing that element in arriving at the tax for 1943 which
consists of the tax on the aggregate of the net gifts for all years
prior to 1943, the specific exemption is taken at $30,000 even
though under the law in force during those years it was in excess
of $30,000. This is an advantage for the taxpayer to which he is
justly entitled.
Application of Antendnients
The amendments that have been herein discussed are applicable
only with respect to gifts made in the calendar year 1943, and
subsequent calendar years.4
9
THE INCOME TAX
The income tax chapter of the I.R.C. has been amended in so
many respects by R. A. 1942 as to make it imperative to copfine
the discussion to those changes that are likely to be of the greatest
general interest. The selection of topics has been made in the light
of that objective.
Alimony Paynents and Alimony Trusts
No prior federal income tax act has contained any express
provision on the subject of alimony. It was held in one of the
early cases decided after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment that alimony payments were not income to their recipient. 50
This has remained the law ever since so far as direct payments
from the former husband are concerned. The whole law on the
income tax status of alimony has now been changed. The most
important change was effected by a redefinition of gross income."
This requires a wife who is divorced or legally separated from
her husband under a decree of divorce or separate maintenance to
treat as her income periodic payments (whether or not made at
regular intervals) received subsequent to the decree so far as
those payments are in discharge of a legal obligation which is
based upon marital or family relationship and imposed upon the
husband by the decree or incurred by him under a written instru-
ment incident to such divorce or separation. If the periodic pay-
ments are attributable to property transferred by the husband in
discharge of obligations of the character described above, they are
still to be treated as income to the divorced or separated wife.
-OR. A. 1942, sec. 451.
-"Gould v. Gould, (1917) 245 U. S. 151, 38 S. Ct. 53, 62 L. Ed. 211.
-11.R.C., sec. 22(k), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 120(a).
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Payments attributable to property so transferred are expressly
excluded from the husband's income. It is immaterial whether
the said property is transferred in trust or otherwise. An example
of a transfer of property not in trust is the purchase by the hus-
band of an annuity payable to the wife. If the transfer is in trust
to pay the income from the trust res to the wife, the matter is
governed by a new section added to the I.R.C.5 2 It will be noted
that the provision applies only to periodic payments. There is no
change in the rule that a single lump-sum payment in discharge of
obligations of the character herein considered are not income to
the wife. A special rule is provided where the decree or instru-
ment calls for the payment of a principal sum payable in install-
ments. A payment of part of such principal sum is deemed a
periodic payment includible in the wife's income only if the decree
or instrument requires or permits the principal sum to be paid
within a period ending more than ten years after the date of the
decree or instrument. But even then the amount to be included in
a wife's income is limited to ten per cent of the principal sum pro-
vided for in the decree or instrument. For that purpose the por-
tion of a payment of such principal sum which is allocable to a
period after the taxable year of the wife in which it is received is
considered an installment payment for the year in which she re-
ceives it. Examples will clarify the meaning of these provisions.
Assume a decree awarding a wife alimony in the principal sum of
$100,000, payable in equal annual installments of $10,000 during
a period ending ten years after the date of the decree. The $10.000
annually received by the wife and paid by the husband are not
deemed "periodic payments." Hence they do not constitute in-
come to her nor deductions for him. Assume, however, that the
decree awards her $100,000, payable in equal annual installments
of $5,000 for a period ending twenty years after the date of the
decree. If this arrangement is carried out, the wife is chargeable
with $5,000 income on account of its receipt, and the husband is en-
titled to an equal annual deduction. If in the latter case the husband
pays the wife during 1943 $20,000, consisting of the $5,000 due
for 1943, and the installments due in 1944, 1945, and 1946, or for
any other years after 1943, or merely to hasten the time when the
principal amount shall have been fully paid, then the whole
$20,000 is deemed an installment payment for 1943 even though
$15,000 is allocable to subsequent years. The amount of the
52I.R.C., sec. 171, added by R. A. 1942, sec. 120(c).
REVENUE ACT OF 1942
$20,000 includible in her 1943 income, and deductible by the hus-
band, is limited to ten per cent of the principal sum awarded by
the decree. That is, $10,000 of the $20,000 is income to her and
deductible by him. That would mean that he would have sacrificed
a right to deduct $10,000 in subsequent years, while she would
have been relieved of the necessity for reporting it as income in
those subsequent years. It is to be noted that the terms of the
decree or instrument determine whether installflent payments
constitute periodic payments. The importance of these provisions
in drawing decrees of divorce or separation, and instruments in-
cident thereto, is obvious.
There is another provision equally important in connection
with the matters last mentioned. The new subsection 22 (k) of
the I.R.C. excludes from its operation that part of any periodic
payment which by the terms of the decree or instrument is for
the support of the husband's minor children. If, for instance, the
decree awards $5,000 a year to the wife of which $1,000 is to be
used by her to support the husband's minor children, then only
$4,000 is income to her and deductible by him. If it had awarded
her $5,000 yearly with provision that she should use one-fourth
thereof for the support of such childien, then only $3,750 would
have been income to her and deductible by him. It is also provided
that if a periodic payment should be less than the decree or instru-
ment awarded, the first charge against it is the amount provided
for the support of the husband's minor children. "rake the first
example given above. If during any given year the husband had
paid but $4,000 of the decreed $5,000, then but $3,000 would be
income to the wife and deductible by him. If he had paid but
$1,000, no part of it would have been income to her or deductible
by him. If the decree, or instrument, merely imposes upon the
wife the duty to provide for the husband's minor children, but
allocates no part of the periodic payment thereto, then, as long as
the decree or instrument remains unmodified, the whole amount
paid to the wife is income to her and deductible by the husband.
There is no requirement that she be the mother of such minor
children.
The next important change in this field is the special provision
governing alimony trusts,53 The doctrine that income from an
alimony trust was chargeable for income tax purposes to the hus-
band in those cases where, after the decree, he remained under a
I.R.C., sec. 171, added by R. A. 1942, sec. 120(c).
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continuing obligation, legal or assumed by an instrument incident
to the divorce, to support his divorced wife, was established by
Douglas v. Willcuts, 4 and has remained intact ever since. ' 5 It has
now been abolished. The income which a wife, who has been
divorced or legally separated from the settlor, is entitled to receive
from an alimony trust, and which but for the new provision
would be includible in the settlor's gross income,a5 must now be
included in hers. It is expressly provided that it shall be excluded
from his gross income despite any other provision of the income
tax chapter of the I.R.C. If any part of the income receivable by
her from the trust is required by the terms of the decree or trust
instrument to be used for the support of the husband's minor
children, such part shall not be includible in the wife's gross in-
come. The principles for allocating the trust income between pay-
ment to her and payments for the support of the said minor child-
ren are the same as those applicable where provision for alimony
is by a method other than the alimony trust. These have already
been considered. To the extent that trust income is used for the
support of such minor children in accordance with the provisions
of the decree or trust instrument, the trust is a maintenance trust
and the income chargeable to the husband.57
These changes in the legal status of alimony payments re-
quired adjustments in certain other provisions of the I.R.C. In
order to prevent them from charging the same income to both the
wife and the husband, a provision was added to Section 23 of the
I.R.C. authorizing the husband to deduct from his gross income
any alimony payments which the wife is required to include in her
gross income.58 The deduction for any taxable year is limited to
the amount paid within the husband's taxable year, regardless of
whether he reports on the cash or accruals basis. The husband
may not take a deduction for any amount received by the wife if
such amount is expressly excludible from his gross income. For
example, amounts received by the wife from the income of an
alimony trust are expressly excluded from the husband's gross
54(1935) 296 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 59, 80 L. Ed. 3.5aSee Helvering v. Fitch, (1940) 309 U. S. 149, 60 S. Ct. 427, 84 L. Ed.
665; Helvering v. Leonard, (1940) 310 U. S. 80, 60 S. Ct. 780, 84 L. Ed.
1087.5rSee in this connection, Pearce v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, (1942)
315 U. S. 543, 62 S. Ct. 754, 86 L. Ed. 1016.
5TSee Schweitzer v. Con'r of Internal Revenue, (1935) 75 Fed. (2d)
702, reversed, (1935) 296 U. S. 551, 56 S. Ct. 304, 80 L. Ed. 389.58I.R.C., sec. 23(u), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 120(b).
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income. He may not deduct the amount so received by her since
it has never entered his income account for tax purposes. Its ex-
clusion from his gross income has the same effect upon his net
income as if he had been required to include it in his gross income
and at the same time been permitted to deduct it therefrom.
Another adjustment occurs where the alimony payments take the
form of payments under a life insurance, endowment, or annuity
contract. The general rule set forth in Section 22(b) (1) and
(2) (A) " ' of the I.R.C. excludes the whole or part of such pay-
ments from gross income. This has been amended to make the
general rule inapplicable to so much of such payments as are re-
quired to be included in the income of a divorced or separated
wife." ' Furthermore, since these would be considered alimony
payments attributable to property transferred by the husband,
they would not enter his gross income and would, therefore, be
non-deductible by him under I.R.C., Section 23(u), already dis-
cussed in this paragraph. Thus, if the divorced husband met his
alimony obligation by purchasing for, or assigning to, his former
wife an annuity contract paying her $1000 per year, the whole
$1000 is income to her, is excluded from his income, and is non-
deductible by hin. The last adjustment prevents the divorced
husband from treating the payments made to the former wife
which are includible in her income as payments for the support of
a dependent."1 That is, he cannot, by virtue of those payments,
treat her as a dependent for computing his credit for dependents."-
The amendments dealing with the treatment of alimony pay-
ments apply only to taxable years that begin after December 31,
1941. '; It will be the calendar year 1942 for all taxpayers report-
ing on a calendar year basis. There is, however, an exception to
the general rule for the case in which the husband and his former
wife have different taxable years. Two cases are possible: (1)
where the husband's first taxable year beginning after December
31. 1941, begins prior to the wife's first taxable year beginning
after that date; and (2) where the husband's first such taxable
year begins after the beginning of the wife's first taxable year be-
gining after said date. In either case, the amendments first be-
"JI.R.C., sec. 22(b) (2) (A) was, prior to its amendment by R. A. 1942,
I.R.C., sec. 22(b) (2).
6oI.R.C., see. 22(b) (2) (A), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 120(d).
61I.R.C., sec. 25(b) (2) (A), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 120(e) (1).
62See also for a definition of the terms "husband" and "wife," I.R.C.,
see. 3797(a) (17), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 120(f).
I"'R. A. 1942, sec. 120(g).
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come applicable to the husband on the first day of the wife's tax-
able year beginning after that date. This would mean, in the
second case, that they took effect during the husband's taxable
year beginning prior to December 31, 1941. An example will
clarify the matter. Assume that the husband reports on the basis
of a fiscal year ending on March 31, and the wife on a fiscal year
basis ending February 28. In that case the amendments become
applicable to the wife on March 1, 1942, and to the husband on
that same date although this is within a taxable year of the hus-
band beginning prior to December 31, 1941.
Decedent's Income
The method for treating the tax problems of a taxpayer for
the taxable year in which falls the date of his death has been the
subject of some experimentation. A person cannot so time his
death that all his claims to income will have been collected and
all his obligations which, if paid, would constitute deductions, will
have been paid, prior to his death. Prior to the enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1934, such income items never became income to
any income taxpayer if decedent reported on a cash basis, although
they did constitute an asset for estate tax purposes. Similarly
the deduction items would never be deductible by any income tax-
payer in the case of such decedent, although they too would con-
stitute deductions for estate tax purposes. The same considera-
tions would apply if the decedent were reporting on an accruals
basis so far as the conditions precedent to the duty to accrue in-
come or the right to accrue deductions had not been met prior
to the taxpayer's death. Congress sought to remedy this defect by
provisions placing all decedents on an accruals basis with respect
to such items for the taxable-year in which their death occurred.
They were first enacted by the Revenue Act of 1934, were con-
tinued in all subsequent Acts, and incorporated into the I.R.C. "
The theory of accrual judicially developed for this special case was
broader than the ordinary accruals theory.65 The enforcement of
these provisions produced many injustices that led to a demand
for their repeal. They have now been repealed so far as cash basis
taxpayers are concerned. As to taxpayers reporting on the ac-
cruals basis, it is now provided that there shall not be included in
their gross income for the taxable year of their death amounts
641.R.C., secs. 42(a) and 43.
65See Helvering v. Estate of Enright, (1941) 312 U. S. 636, 61 S. Ct.
777, 85 L. Ed. 1093: Pfaff v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, (1941) 312 U. S.
646, 61 S. Ct. 783, 85 L. Ed. 1099.
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accrued only by reason of their death.66 A similar rule is applied
to deductions and credits.6 7 Income items and deductions are still
accrued in such case, but an artificial theory of accruals in which
the fact of the taxpayer's death is a dominant factor is precluded.
These provisions do not apply to amounts includible in computing
decedent's share in the net income of a partnership of which he is
a member. The amendments are applicable to taxable years begin-
ning after December 31, 1942.7 However, all Revenue Acts be-
ginning with that of 1934, and the I.R.C., are retroactively amend-
ed to incorporate the changes, and refunds may be obtainable in
the case of the estates of some decedents who died prior to the
change, but subject to important conditions.6 9
The gross income which escapes taxation to the decedent under
the revised method does not, however, entirely escape taxation.70
There is no return to the status quo existing prior to the enact-
ment of the 1934 Act. It is includible in the gross income of the
person entitled to receive it after the death of the decedent, and
must be included in the taxable year of such person during which
he receives it. The persons designated are the estate of the de-
cedent if it acquires the right to receive the item of income from
the decedent. This is likely to be the most usual case. If, how-
ever, the estate does not so acquire such right, or distributes the
right to a legatee, devisee, or heir, then it becomes income to the
person receiving it in that capacity. The new section also provides
for the case in which the right to receive the income is not acquired
by either the estate, a legatee, devisee or heir, but by one who
acquires the right by reason of decedent's death. The beneficiary
named in certain federal bonds purchased on a discount basis
would be such a person. It is to be noted that these provisions
apply only to claims of decedent that would constitute items of in-
come to him if he collected them. They have no bearing on those
of his claims which would constitute capital receipts to him if col-
lected by him.7' If the person entitled to receive it transfers the
right to receive the item, it is includible in his income for the
taxable year of its transfer. The amount includible is its fair
market value at the time of the transfer or the actual consideration
6;I.R.C., sec. 42(a), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 134(a).
1,11.R.C., see. 43, as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 134(b).
1 R. A. 1942, sec. 134(f).
60R. A. 1942, sec. 134(g).7QI.R.C., sec. 126. added by R. A. 1942, sec. 134(e).
7lGains realized in such a capital transaction would, however, constitute
income to the person acquiring such capital claim from the decedent.
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received for the transfer, whichever is the greater. If, for ex-
ample, a legatee receives a claim of decedent for salary earned be-
fore his death, and sells it before collecting it, the value at the
time of the sale is income to him unless the consideration received
exceeds that value in which case he realizes income in the amount
of the consideration received. If he had given it away, he would
have realized income in an amount equal to the value of the claim
at the time of the gift. An executor's or administrator's transfer
of the claim to the legatee is not considered a transfer thereof in-
volving realization of income to the transferor, since it is a trans-
fer to one who must himself treat the amount collected on the
claim as income. This is merely an illustration of the general
principle embodied in the new section.
Another important principle defines the character of the in-
come when received by the person who acquires the right to re-
ceive it in the ways described above. He is treated as if he had
acquired the right in the transaction by which the decedent ac-
quired it, and the amount includible in the former's gross income
is considered to have the character it would have had if the de-
cedent had lived and received it. Thus, if decedent's right to the
item arose out of his performance of personal services, the estate,
legatee, etc., is deemed to acquire it in that same manner; and, if
it would have been earned income to decedent had he lived and
received it, it is earned income to the estate, legatee, etc. In view
of the limit on the amount that may be treated by an individual as
earned income, a question might arise whether the estate, legatee,
etc. could treat it as such if the amount treated as earned income
in the decedent's return for the year of his death was already the
maximum. It might be argued that its status should be deter-
mined by what would have been its status to decedent in the year
the estate, legatee, etc., receive it had the decedent received it in
such year. On the same principle, that which would be a capital
gain if received by the decedent is a capital gain to the estate, lega-
tee, etc., entitled to receive it.
The decedent may have incurred liabilities in respect of items
of a character deductible in computing his net income. So far as
those are not properly allowable in computing his net income for
the taxable year of his death, or prior taxable years, provision is
made to permit their deduction, when paid, after his death. This
principle applies to deductible expenses, interest, taxes, and de-
pletion, and also to the foreign tax credit. They are deductible
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by the decedent's estate unless it is not liable to discharge the
obligation to which the deduction or credit relates. In that event
they are deductible by the person who, by reason of decedent's
death or by bequest, devise, or inheritance, acquires, subject to
such obligation, from decedent an interest in property of the de-
cedent. An example may help to clarify this. Assume that de-
cedent owned his home, and that the taxes thereon had accrued
when he died but were payable after his death. Assume that the
state law makes the property itself solely liable for the taxes
thereon. The taxes are deductible under the federal income tax
laws. They would not be deductible by decedent if he were re-
porting on the cash basis. Nor are they payable by the decedent's
estate. Under the new Section 126 of the I.R.C., they could be de-
ducted by the devisee of decedent's home. This would be true
even though such devisee did not acquire from the decedent any
iten that he would have to include in his gross income under the
principles heretofore discussed. The right to take the deduction
depends not upon acquiring claims to income items from the de-
cedent but upon acquiring from him property subject to the obli-
gation to which the deduction relates. The right to receive an
income claim of decedent is, however, property acquired from
decedent. The right to deduct the credit for foreign taxes was
undoubtedly granted for the benefit of one who acquires from
decedent a right to receive income from foreign sources, and he is
the person entitled to take it. The right to take the depletion de-
duction is expressly made to follow the right to receive the income
to which it relates, and must be taken by the recipient of that in-
conic in the taxable year of its receipt.
It is also expressly provided that the recipient of income in re-
spect of a decedent may deduct, for the taxable year that he re-
ceives it as income, an amount equal to a part of the decedent's
estate tax. The formula for computing this deduction is extremely
complicated, but its steps may be summarized as follows:
(1) Compute the value at which decedent's claims to gross in-
come were included in his gross estate.
(2) Compute the deductions from the gross estate in respect
of claims against the decedent which represent the deduc-
tions and credit that decedent could have taken for in-
come tax purposes had he lived and which others may
now take under I.R.C., Sec. 126(b).
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(3) Subtract Item (2) from Item (1), which gives what the
statute calls "the net value for estate tax purposes" of
decedent's claims to gross income.
(4) Compute value for estate tax purposes of those of de-
cedent's claims to gross income received by the taxpayer
whose income tax is being computed (or amount for
which he included it in his gross income if that is less
than said value).
(5) Compute decedent's estate tax on his estate, including the
items referred to in Item (1).
(6) Compute decedent's estate tax on the basis of a gross
estate arrived at by deducting from the gross estate used
in Item (5) an amount equal to Item (3).
(7) Subtract Item (6) from Item (5). This gives what the
statute describes as the "estate tax attributable to" the
"net value" described in Item (3).
(8) Multiply Item (7) by a fraction whose numerator is
Item (4) and whose denominator is Item (1).
(9) The amount of decedent's estate tax that the taxpayer,
whose income tax is being computed, may deduct is equal
to Item (8).
Section 23 of the I.R.C. is amended to reflect the right to deduc-
tions considered in this and the preceding paragraphs.
72
The amendments made to the I.R.C. by the addition of Section
126, and by adjusting Section 23 in the manner described above,
are applicable with respect to taxable years ending after December
31, 1942.7
3
Taxable Years
Section 47 of the I.R.C., which deals with returns for a period
of less than 12 months, has been amended in several respects. The
requirement for annualizing the return where the short period is
due to a change in accounting period has been extended to cor-
porations.7 4 In addition a relief provision has been added.75 Two
methods are provided. The first applies where the taxpayer con-
72Sec. 23(w), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 134(d).
73R. A. 1942, sec. 134(f).
74I.R.C., sec. 47(c), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 135(a). For the
special clhsses of corporations to which the annualizing of income is inap-
plicable, see I.R.C., secs. 102, 336, 393, 505, all as amended by R. A. 1942,
sec. 135(b).7 I.R.C., sec. 47(c), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 135(a).
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tinues in existence for at least 12 months after the first day of the
short period. In that case he must compute his tax and file his
return without regard to this provision. Subsequently he may
compute a tax on his net income for the 12 months beginning with
the first day of the short period (which is treated as if it were a
taxable year), under the law applicable to such year. The reduced
tax is such portion of the tax so computed as the net income for
the short period is of the net income for such 12-month period.
The second method applies where the taxpayer is not in existence
for the 12-month period referred to above, or, if it is a corporation,
disposes of substantially all its assets prior to the end of such
period. In that case the taxpayer computes his net income for the
12-month period ending with the last day of his short period. The
rest of the procedure is the same as under the first method. The
reduced tax shall in no case be less than the tax computed on the
basis of the net income of the short period without placing it on an
annual basis. Taxpayers wishing to take advantage of this pro-
vision must make timely application therefor. The Commissioner
may prescribe regulations for applying this relief provision. A
further new paragraph is added to Section 47 requiring a tax-
payer who is not in existence for the whole of an annual account-
ing period ending on the last day of a month, or who has no such
annual accounting period during the whole of a calendar year, to
make his return for the fractional part of the year during which
he was in existence. 76 Under the prior law such taxpayers had to
make returns for such period as the Commissioner required under
administrative regulations. The amendment provides for a uni-
form treatment of such cases.
The frequent changes in federal income tax laws gave rise to a
special problem in the case of fiscal year taxpayers. Their taxable
year consisted of two parts falling in calendar years to which diff-
erent laws applied. The solution that prevailed until the enact-
ment of the Revenue Act of 1932 was to make their tax for such
year the sum of (1) a tax computed under the law applicable to
the first calendar year in which a part of their taxable year fell,
divided by 12 and multiplied by the number of months of their
taxable year falling within that calendar year, and (2) a tax com-
puted under the law applicable to the second calendar year in
which the balance of their taxable year fell, divided by 12 and
multiplied by the number of months of their taxable year falling
' I.R.C., sec. 47(g). added by R. A. 1942, sec. 135(c).
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within that second calendar year. The 1932 Act changed this by
permitting the entire tax to be computed under the law in force
during the first calendar year in which fell part of their fiscal year.
That is, they did not become subject to the new Act until after
their current taxable year had ended. It gave fiscal taxpayers
a decided advantage during a period when each new Revenue Act
increased tax rates. It is, however, still the law except as modified
by Section 140 of R. A. 1942.Y1 That Section provides a special
rule for taxpayers with taxable years beginning in 1941 and end-
ing after June 30, 1942. In the' case of non-corporate taxpayers
the tax is determined as follows: (a) compute a tentative tax
under the law in force during 1941 at the rates prevailing there-
under, divide that by the number of days in the taxable year, and
multiply the quotient by the number of days in the taxable year
before July 1, 1942; (b) compute a tentative tax under the law
prevailing during 1941 but at the rates prescribed by the amend-
ments made by R. A. 1942, divide by the number of days in the
taxable year, and multiply the quotient by the number of days in
the taxable year after June 30, 1942; (c) the tax equals the sum
of (a) and (b). The computation in the case of corporate tax-
payers is somewhat different. The first step (a) is the same as for
non-corporate taxpayers. But in step (b) the rates prescribed by
the amendments made by R. A. 1942 are applied not to net income
as defined under the law in force during 1941 but to that as modi-
fied by specified amendments made by R. A. 1942.7" The tax pay-
able is again the sum of (a) and (b). These provisions are ap-
plicable only to taxable years beginning in 1941 and ending after
June 30, 1942."9 They do not apply to insurance companies sub-
ject to Supplement G, investment companies subject to Supple-
ment Q, or Western Hemisphere Trade Corporations covered by
Section 109, added to the I.R.C. by R. A. 1942, Section 141.8o
Gross Income-Coimmodity Credit Loans
The income tax is based on net income minus certain credits
77This added a Section 108 to the I.R.C.75The amendments referred to are as follows: I.R.C., sec. 13(a) (2)
and 13(b) (2), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 105(a) ; I.R.C., sec. 15, as
amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 105(b) ; I.R.C., sec. 23(c) (1) (B) and 23(c)(2), as amended or repealed by R. A. 1942, sec. 105(c) ; I.R.C., sec. 26(e),
as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 105(d) , I.R.C., sec. 26(b), as amended by
R. A. 1942, sec. 105(e) (1). In connection with the amendment of I.R.C.,
sec. 15, see for exception to its application, I.R.C., sec. 108(a) (1) (B),
added by R. A. 1942, sec. 140(a).
79R. A. 1942, sec. 140(b).
'o.R.C., sec. 108(b), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 140(a).
REVENUE ACT OF 1942
against it. Net income is defined to mean gross income computed
under Section 22 less the deductions allowed by Section 23.81 The
statutory concept of gross income is thus one of the most impor-
tant factors determining a taxpayer's liability. Its principal ele-
ments are stated in Section 22 of the I.R.C. The changes made
therein, and in other sections dealing with gross income problems,
must now be considered.
The proceeds of loans are capital receipts, not income. They
have been generally so treated under federal income tax laws. A
permissive departure from this principle was introduced by the
Revenue Act of 1939 with respect to the proceeds of loans made
by the Commodity Credit Corporation, and this was carried into
the I.R.C. as Section 123 thereof. It was intended as a relief
measure for farmers borrowing from that Corporation on the se-
curity of farm products. It gave such borrowers an election to
treat such proceeds as income includible in their gross income for
the taxable year of their receipt. The election could be made for
any taxable year beginning after December 31, 1938, and the pro-
vision was made retroactive for any year subject to tax under
the Revenue Acts of 1934, 1936, or 1938, if election were made
within one year from date of enactment of the 1939 Act.S2 A new
provision has been added to Section 123 of the I.R.C., whose
effect is to permit such borrower to elect this method for any tax-
able year beginning after December 31, 1938, and before January
1, 1942, but the election must be made at, or prior to, the time for
filing the return for his taxable year beginning during 1942.83 He
may, however. do so only if his records are sufficient to permit an
accurate computation of his income for such years, and if he con-
.ents to the assessment of deficiencies for any such years though
the statute of limitations may have run against their assessment.
Furthermore, Section 223(d) of the 1939 Act has been amended
so as to permit such borrower to make an election with respect to
any taxable year subject to the Revenue Acts of 1934, 1936, and
193S.- He must make such election within the same period men-
tiuned above. There is no change in the requirement that the bor-
rower must follow the method in subsequent taxable years unless
the Commissioner authorizes a change.
11 I.R.C., sec. 21.
" ,ev. Act of 1939, sec. 223(d).
"I.R.C., sec. 123(c). added by R. A. 1942, sec. 154(a).
"tRev. Act of 1939, sec. 223(d), as amended by R. A. 1942, see. 154(b).
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Gross Income-Annuities
Section 22(b) (1) of the I.R.C. excludes from gross income
amounts received under a life insurance contract paid by reason
of the insured's death. Section 22(b) (2) thereof provides for ex-
cluding therefrom a limited amount received under life insurance
or endowment contracts (other than amounts paid by reason of
the insured's death and the amounts received as annuities) or as
an annuity under an annuity or endowment contract. It also pro-
vides that the amount recoverable tax-free, where an insurance,
endowment, or annuity contract is transferred for a valuable con-
sideration, shall not exceed the actual value of the consideration
plus the premiums or others sums subsequently paid by the trans-
feree. The amendment made by R. A. 1942 merely excepts from
the principle stated in the preceding sentence the case where the
transferee of such a contract (or an interest therein) takes the
loss or gain basis of the transferor with respect to such contract
(or interest therein). The cases in which the transferee takes the
transferor's basis are described in Section 113(a) of the I.R.C.
An example would be the acquisition by one corporation, in the
course of a reorganization as defined in Section 112 (g) of the
I.R.C., of an insurance policy taken out by the transferor corpora-
tion on the life of its president in which it was the beneficiary. The
effect of the exception is that the proceeds paid on the insured's
death have the same status when received by the transferee that
they would have had in the hands of the transferor had it received
them."5 The amendment is made applicable to taxable years be-
ginning after December 31, 1940. There may be some taxpayers
entitled to refunds as a result thereof.
R. A. 1942 also adds a new subparagraph to Section 22(b) (2)
of the I.R.C. 6 It deals with the treatment by an employee of the
amounts received by him under an annuity purchased by his em-
ployer under a plan with respect to which the employer's contri-
bution is deductible under I.R.C., Section 2 3 (p) (1) (B) (deduc-
tion of amounts paid to pension trusts), or under an annuity con-
tract purchased by an employer exempt from tax under I.R.C.,
Section 101 (6). Space limitations prevent a detailed analysis of
85For the treatment of such a case under prior law, see King Plow Co.
v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, (1940) 110 Fed. (2d) 649.
61I.R.C., sec. 22(b) (2) (B), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 162(c).
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the method under which the employee must compute his income
from this source..-
Gross Income-Gifts, Bequests, Etc.
All federal income tax laws since 1913 have excluded from
gross income the value of property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or inheritance, but included therein the income from such
property.-x The amendments leave these principles intact, but have
clarified the meaning of the latter requirement. It is now expressly
provided that a gift, etc., of income from property is includible in
the recipient's gross income.' This merely gives statutory form
to an accepted construction of prior law.90 However, the amend-
ment also provides that, if under the terms of the gift, etc., an
amount is to be paid, credited, or distributed at intervals, it is to
be deemed a gift, etc., of income to the extent that it is paid,
credited, or to be distributed out of income from property. An
example based on an actual case may clarify the meaning hereof.
A bequeaths an annuity to B which is made a charge on the capital
of the estate. During 1943 this annuity is in fact paid out of the
estate's income. Under prior law the amount received by B dur-
ing 1943 would not have been income to B."' It would be includ-
ible in B's 1943 income under the new provision.
It is obvious that the purpose of this amendment will be pro-
mooted by establishing a definite rule for determining when, and
to what extent, such amounts are to be treated as paid, credited,
or to be distributed from income. The applicable rule provides
that, if such amounts can be paid, credited, or distributed out of
something other than income (i.e., out of corpus), the amount
paid, credited, or to be distributed during the taxable year of an
estate or trust is treated as coming from income if the total thus
paid, credited, or to be distributed is not in excess of the "distri-
butable income" of the estate or trust for that taxable year. If,
however, the aggregate amount paid, credited, or to be distributed
during a given taxable year exceeds such "distributable income,"
the amount deemed received by any legatee, heir, or beneficiary
out of income is computed as follows: (1) Compute the "distribu-
47For another amendment to I.R.C., sec. 22(b) (2), see discussion of
alimony payments, p. 237, supra.
-See I.R.C., sec. 22(b) (3).
-'I.R.C., sec. 22(b)(3), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 111(a).
'-See Irwin v. Gavit, (1925) 268 U. S. 161, 45 S. Ct. 475, 69 L. Ed.
897.
1"See Burnet v. Whitehouse, (1931) 283 U. S. 148, 51 S. Ct. 374. 75
L. Ed. 916.
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table income" of the estate or trust for the taxable year in ques-
tion; (2) determine the amount paid, credited, or to be distributed
to any given legatee, heir, or beneficiary during that taxable year;
(3) determine the aggregate amount paid, credited, or to be dis-
tributed, to all legatees, heirs, or beneficiaries during that taxable
.year; (4) divide Item (1) by Item (3), and multiply the quotient
thereof by Item (2). The amount deemed paid, etc., out of in-
come to the given legatee, etc., is the answer obtained by perform-
ing the operations described in Item (4) .92 This insures that the
whole "distributable income" for the estate's or trust's taxable
year will become income to those to whom the estate or trust pays
or credits amounts included within the principle. It should be
noted in this connection that the principle applies only to such
amounts as are to be paid or credited at intervals. It does not
apply to amounts payable in a lump sum. These may be made,
even from income, without becoming part of the recipient's gross
income. The following examples illustrate the above discussion.
A makes bequests of annuities to B for $5,000 and to C for
$10,000, and creates a testamentary trust to insure their payment
out of either the trust's annual income or its corpus. Assume that
the trust, B, and C all report on a calendar year basis. If during
1943 the trust's "distributable income" equals or exceeds $15,000,
the whole amounts paid during 1943 to B and C are deemed to be
paid out of income and includible in B's and C's 1943 gross in-
come. If, however, the trust's "distributable income" had been
but $10,000 only two-thirds of the amounts paid to B and C would
enter their respective gross incomes. If A had merely bequeathed
B and C $5,000 and $10,000, respectively, payable in a lump sum.
and the trustee had in fact paid each his bequest during 1943 from
the trust's "distributable income," neither would have had to in-
clude such sum in his 1943 gross income since the bequests were
not of amounts "to be paid at intervals."
The amount deemed paid from income under the principle dis-
cussed in the preceding, paragraph is seen to depend upon the
trust's "distributable income" for the taxable year of the trust.
This is a new concept. It means either (1) the net income of the
estate or trust computed by taking as deductions the income which
92I.R.C., 162(d)(1), added by R.A. 1942, sec. 111(c). The amounts
deemed paid out of income under this provision would be deductible in
computing the net income of the estate or trust under I.R.C.. see. 162(b).
(c), and would make inapplicable thereto the principles applied in Helver-
ing v. Pardee, (1933) 290 U. S. 365, 54 S. Ct. 221, 78 L. Ed. 365.
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is to be currently distributed (where the instrument creating it
provides therefor) and the income actually distributed (where
the trustee has discretion to distribute or accumulate the income),
or (2) the income of the estate or trust minus the items referred
to as deductible under (1), whichever is the greater. 3 The net in-
come referred to in (1) means net income as defined by the in-
come tax law. The income referred to in (2) means the income as
defined by the law that determines what is available for distribu-
tion to those entitled to income from the property. The deduc-
tions mentioned do not include payments that can be made from
corpus, nor amounts distributable during the estate's or trust's
taxable year from income of prior years.94
There is one other amendment to Section 162 of the I.R.C.
that must be considered. It concerns cases in which an amount
that can be paid at intervals out of something other than income
becomes payable during the first 65 days of any taxable year of an
estate or trust9-' In such case a part thereof is treated as paid,
credited, or to be distributed on the last day of the preceding tax-
able year of the estate or trust. The part to be so treated is that
which bears to the total amount that becomes payable within
said 65 day period the same ratio that the part of the inter-
val at which payments are to be made which falls outside the tax-
able year of the payment bears to the total interval. For example,
assume that A makes a bequest to B of $1800 payable on February
I of each year, that such amount can be paid out of capital, and
that he is paid it on February 1, 1943. The part deemed paid him
Wn December 31, 1942 (assuming the estate or trust is on a calen-
dar year basis) equals 334/365ths of $1800. A variation occurs
where the part of the interval falling outside the taxable year of
the estate or trust in which payment is made exceeds 12 months.
In that case the interval is deemed to commence on the date which
is 12 months before the end of the taxable year in which the part
is deemed paid. If, for example, the $1800 above were assumed
to be payable every other year on February 1, the total interval
would be 2 years, and that part falling outside of 1943 would be
"!I.R.C., sec. 162(d) (1), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 111(c).
-For the method of allocating as between taxable years trust income
distributable out of income of prior years, see I.R.C., sec. 162(d) (2),
added by R. A. 1942, sec. 111(c). It does not apply to amounts that
can be paid or credited at intervals out of other than income, which alone
is governed by I.R.C., sec. 162(d)(1) to which the discussion in the text
relates.
11,I.R.C., sec. 162(d) (3) (B), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 111(c).
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23 months. The interval would then be deemed to commence on
January 1, 1942, and thus become 396 days. This reduces the
time falling outside the taxable year 1943 to 365 days, and thus
the total deemed paid on December 31, 1942, would equal
365/396ths of $1800.-" The part of the amount deemed paid on
December 31, 1942, out of income (as distinct from corpus) would
be computed in the manner already considered on the basis of the
facts of 1942.97
Gross Incoine-Tax-Free Interest
Section 22(b) (4) of the I.R.C. excludes from gross income
the interest on certain public obligations. It provides that in the
case of obligations of the United States issued after September 1,
1917, and of obligations of a corporation organized under an Act
of Congress, the interest shall be exempt only if and to the ex-
tent provided in the Acts authorizing their issue, or amendments
thereof, and shall be excluded from gross income only if and to
the extent that it is wholly exempt from federal income taxes;
that is, only if and to the extent that it is exempt from both normal
and surtax. An exception to this principle was made for postal
savings certificates of deposit. The interest on them was exclud-
ible from gross income. That exception has now been limited to
the interest on such certificates of deposit to the extent that they
represent deposits made before March 1, 1941.9* The amendment
is made effective as of March 1, 1941.' 9
Gross Income-Military Pensions
Sec. 22(b) (5) of the I.R.C. excludes from gross income
amounts received as compensation for injuries or sickness. This
has been amended in two respects. There has been added to the
exclusion "amounts received as a pension, annuity, or similar al-
lowance for personal injuries or sickness resulting from active
service in the armed forces of any country."'100 The language is
broad enough to include such amounts received from the countries
96A similar rule is applied where distributions from income are made
within the first 65 days of the estate's or trust's taxable year; see I.R.C.,
sec. 162(d) (3) (A), added by R. A. 1942. sec. 111(c). As to reasons for
such a provision, see Com'r of Int. Revenue v. Dean, (1939) 102 Fed. (2d)
699.
97As to effective date of the several amendments discussed in this
section, see R. A. 1942, sec. 111(e).
oSI.R.C., sec. 22(b)(4), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 112(a).
99R. A. 1942, sec. 112(c).
I0OI.R.C., see. 22(b) (5), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 113.
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with which we are at present at war for active service in their
armed forces during that very war.10'
Gross Income-Income from Discharge of Indebtedness
It has been decided by the Supreme Court that a taxpayer
may realize income from the advantageous discharge of a debt
owed by him. Thus a corporation issuing its bonds at par would,
if solvent after the purchase of any of those bonds, realize income
if it repurchased or redeemed them for less than par. 0 2 The Rev-
enue Act of 1939 permitted corporate taxpayers to exclude such
income (a) if the debt were evidenced by a bond, debenture, note,
certificate, or other evidence of indebtedness, in existence on Jne
1. 1939; (b) if the corporation was shown to be in an unsound
financial condition; and (c) if it consented in writing to apply
the amount thus excluded from gross income to reduce the loss or
gain basis of any property held by it at any time during the tax-
able year in which such indebtedness was so discharged. 3 It was
originally applicable only if such discharge occurred between June
29, 1939 and the close of a taxable year beginning prior to De-
cember 31, 1942. This period has been extended to the close of a
taxable year beginning prior to December 31, 1945. It has also
been amended to make the provision applicable to any security
(defined as in (a), supra) issued by any corporation regardless
of the date of its issue, and to remove the condition that the
debtor be in an unsound financial condition.0 4 The changes af-
ford corporate debtors a favorable opportunity for repurchasing
their bonds, etc., if market conditions should be favorable at any
time during the extended period of this provision's application.' 0 '
Gross Incomne-Improvements by Lessee
The effect upon a lessor's income of improvements made on
the leased premises by a lessee, which enhanced the value of the
"'For another amendment of I.R.C., sec. 22(b) (5), see "Deductions-
Medical Expenses." infra. pp. 272, 273.
102United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., (1931) 284 U. S. 1, 52 S. Ct.
4. 76 L. Ed. 131.
103I.R.C., sec. 22 (b) (9), added by Rev. Act of 1939, sec. 215(a). It
also provided for excluding any unamortized premium with respect to such
indebtedness from gross income, and any unamortized discount with respect
thereto from deductions. As to the adjustment of the basis of the debtor's
property. see I.R.C.. sec. 113(b) (3).1"1.RC., sec. 22(b) (9), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 114(a).
11'-A new provision, sec 22(b) (10) is added to the I.R.C. by R. A.
1942. see. 114(b). dealing with discharges of indebtedness of railroad cor-
porations in receivership or bankruptcy proceedings. This is made retro-
active to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1939 (R.A., 1942, sec.
114(c)). Other railroads are included among the corporations to which
I.R.C., Sec. 22(b) (9) applies.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
property when returned to the possession of the lessor, was a
matter long in dispute between the Treasury and the taxpayers.
An early case held that no part of the value of improvements made
prior to the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment could be
treated as income to the lessor for any year subsequent thereto. 108
It was later decided that no part of their value could be treated as
income to the lessor for any year while the lessee remained in
possession. 107 A later decision of the Supreme Court held that
the increase in value of the premises resulting from the improve-
ments could validly be included in the lessor's income during the
year of the forfeiture or other termination of the lease.1"- The
matter will for the future be governed by a new provision of the
I.R.C. which excludes from the lessor's gross income any "income,
other than rent, derived by a lessor of real property upon the ter-
mination of a lease, representing the value of such property at-
tributable to buildings or other improvements by the lessee."J'
\Vhile the amendment excludes such value only for the year of the
termination of the lease, the change, coupled with prior decisions.
excludes any part of the value of such improvements (or of the
value of the property attributable to them) from the lessor's gross
income for any other year as well. A question may arise whether
lessors may hereafter validly be extended an optional method of
treatment with respect to this matter. The probable answer is
negative. In any event, it would be a futile thing, especially in the
light of R. A. 1942, Section 115(b).
The exclusion discussed in the preceding paragraph does not
mean the permanent exclusion from the lessors' gross income of
any gain he may ultimately realize from such improvements. His
loss or gain basis with respect to such real property would have
increased to the extent that he had included any part of such in-
creased value in his income. He is now expressly denied the
privilege of adjusting his loss or gain basis with respect to such
property for any increased value excludible from his gross income
under the amendment discussed in the preceding paragraph."'
There are, however, taxpayers who included some of such increase
To6,filler v. Gearin, (1919) 258 Fed. 225.
107M. E. Blatt Co. v. U. S., (1938) 305 U. S. 267, 59 S. Ct. 186, 83
L. Ed. 167.
10SHelvering v. Bruun, (1940) 309 U. S. 461, 60 S. Ct. 631, 84 L. Ed.
257.
10oI.R.C., sec. 22(b) (11), added by R.A. 1942, sec. 115(a).
110I.R.C., sec. 113(c), added by R.A. 1942, sec. 115(b).
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in value in their gross income under prior Regulations1 11 or de-
cisions. If this occurred during any taxable year beginning prior
to January 1, 1942, they may increase their loss or gain basis with
respect to such property by the amount included in their gross
income on that account. 112
Gross Income-Recovery of Bad Debts, Etc.
The concept of income developed in the construction of federal
income tax laws included in gross income for a given year re-
coveries on account of items deducted in computing the tax for a
prior taxable year. The two types of recoveries that produced the
greatest amount of litigation were (1) the recovery of a claim
charged off and deducted as a bad debt in a prior year, and (2)
the recovery of taxes with respect to which a partial or total
refund or credit was obtained in a year subsequent to that in
which the tax had been taken as a deduction. The disputes were of
three types: (a) whether the adjustment should be made by re-
opening the year of the deduction (a procedure impossible where
the statute of limitations had run against the assessment or collec-
tion of taxes for such year) ; (b) whether the adjustment should
be made by including the amount recovered in gross income for the
year of recovery (a method always required where the statute
of limitations had run against the assessment or collection of a tax
for the year of deduction) ; and (c) the amount to be included in
gross income for the year of recovery in cases where that method
of adjustment was required. Taxpayers contended, with respect
to (c), that the amount of any recovery to be included in gross
income should be limited by the so-called "tax benefit" rule. The
amendments now made to the I.R.C. exclude from gross income
that "attributable to the recovery during the taxable year of a
bad debt . . .to the extent of the amount of the recovery exclu-
sion with respect to such debt. . .. "I"
The phrase "recovery exclusion" is defined as "the amount,
determined in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Com-
missioner with the approval of the Secretary, of the deductions...
allowed, on account of such bad debt . . . which did not result
in a reduction of the taxpayer's tax" under the income tax chapter
of the I.R.C. or corresponding provisions of prior revenue laws,
"'See Reg. 103, sec. 19. 22(a)-13.
M-'I.R.C.. sec. 113(c), added by R.A. 1942, sec. 115(b).
112I.R.C., sec. 22(b) (12), added by R.A. 1942, sec. 116(a). The amend-
ments do not resolve the conflicts with respect to issues (a) and (b) men-
tioned in the text.
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"reduced by the amount excludible in previous taxable years with
respect to such debt." 114 This enacts the "tax benefit" rule at
least in part. The Commissioner's power to determine its amount
could conceivably be exercised by treating the deduction for the
bad debt as the first deduction made in computing the taxpayer's
deficit in statutory net income for the year of the deduction. This
would generally mean that the whole of the bad debt deduction
had been used to offset an equal amount of gross income. That,
in turn, would mean that the whole of it had resulted in a reduc-
tion of the taxpayer's tax for that year, and that, therefore, no
part of that recovered was excludible from gross income in the
year of recovery. Such a regulation would defeat the purpose
of the amendment. The deduction whose effect under the "tax
benefit" rule is to be determined will have to be taken as the
last made in arriving at the deficit in statutory net income for
the year in which the deduction was taken. The term "bad debt"
is defined as a "debt on account of worthlessness or partial worth-
lessness of which a deduction was allowed for a prior taxable
year." There is no express requirement that the prior deduction
must have been taken as and for a "debt ascertained to be worth-
less and charged off." It may well be held to include debts evi-
denced by a security although for some years the losses thereon
have been treated as capital losses. The amendments do not apply
to recoveries with respect to bad debts previously charged or
chargeable against a reserve for bad debts where the taxpayer uses
the reserve method for treating his bad debt deduction. Such a
recovery never enters his income under that method. 1"5
The amendments discussed up to this point in this section are
applicable with respect to taxable years beginning after December
31, 19 3 8 ,1111 and are also made effective as if they had been a part
of the Revenue Act of 1939 or any prior revenue Act.11 7 A great
1"4The quoted portion is limited to that applicable to bad debts. The
same language applies to the other two types of recoveries to which this
amendment relates, viz. (a) prior taxes, and (b) delinquency amounts(penalties and interest for failure to file a tax return or pay a tax within
the time required by law, or for failure to file a return or pay a tax. The
language is not expressly restricted to penalties and interest in the case of
income taxes). The principles discussed in the text in their application to
bad debts apply also to the two types of recoveries mentioned in this
footnote.
115For the special rules in the cases of the Section 102 Tax and the
Personal Holding Company Tax, see I.R.C., sec. 22(b) (12) (E), added by
R. A. 1942, sec. 116(a).
116R. A. 1942, sec. 116(b).
117R. A. 1942, sec. 116(c).
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many taxpayers will be entitled to refunds so far as the right
thereto has not been barred by the statute of limitations.
The case in which the recovery is with respect to a federal tax
deducted in a prior year receives special treatment where the tax
has been held unconstitutional. 118 The taxpayer may exclude this
from his gross income to the full amount of the recovery. He
must, however, consent in writing to treat it as not having been
an allowable deduction for the year in which he. deducted it, and
to the assessment of any tax deficiency- resulting from such treat-
ment even though the statute of limitations has already run
against its assessment prior to the filing of such consent. This
provision will undoubtedly be held to apply only to recoveries to
the extent that they are attributable to the unconstitutionality of
the tax. It is expressly made inapplicable to the interest element
in the recovery. This provision does not operate to prevent a tax-
payer from treating such recoveries by the method first discussed
in this section. It is an alternative method enabling him, for a
price, to exclude the whole amount of this particular type of re-
covery from his gross income for the year of the recovery. This
provision is applicable with respect to taxable years beginning
after December 31, 1940.119
Gross Inconze-Military and Naval Allowance
A new provision excludes from gross income a limited amount
received before the termination of the present war as salary or
compensation from the United States for active service in the
military or naval forces of the United States' 20 during that war.
It applies only to personnel below the grade of commissioned
officer. It is limited to $250 in the case of a single person and to
$300 in the case of a married person or the head of a family.
The status for purposes of applying these limits is determined as
of the end of the taxable year.
121
Gross Incomn -Non-Resident Citizens
The I.R.C., Section 116(a). excludes from the gross income
of a citizen of the United States, who was a bona fide non-resident
thereof for more than 6 months during a taxable year, amounts
received from sources without the United States (unless paid by
the United States or any agency thereof), if such amount would
1-I.R.C., sec. 128, added by R. A. 1942, sec. 157(a).
2rR. A. 1942, sec. 157(b).
12('See footnote 10 for definition of "military and naval forces of the
United States."
121I.R.C., see. 22(b) (13), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 117.
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constitute earned income if received from sources within the
United States.12 2 This has been changed to permit such exclusion
only if the taxpayer establishes to the satisfaction of the Commis-
sioner that he was a bona fide resident of a foreign country or
countries during the entire taxable year.12  This part of the
amendment applies only to taxable years beginning after December
31, 1942.124 The amendment has also added a special provision
for the taxable year during which such taxpayer changes his
residence to the United States. 25 If he has been a bona fide
resident of a foreign country or countries for at least 2 years
before the date on which he changes his residence to the United
States, he may exclude from his gross income amounts received
from sources without the United States (unless paid by the United
States or any agency thereof) attributable to the period of his
foreign residence before the date of his change of residence to the
United States. This applies only if the income would have con-
stituted earned income if it had been received from sources within
the United States. It applies, however, even though received
after such change of residence, and even though received in a
taxable year during a part of which he was a resident of the
United States. The right to exclude it depends upon whether it is
attributable to the period of the taxpayer's foreign residence.
Assume thAt A, a citizen of the United States, was a bona fide
resident of Canada from January 1, 1940, until March 31, 1942,
at which date he changed his residence to the United States; that
he was employed there during that period as sales manager for
B Co.; that he changed his residence to the United States on April
1, 1942; that on June 30, 1942, he recovered from B Co. a bonus
for services rendered during the calendar year 1941; and that he
reports on the cash basis. The amount of the bonus would be
excludible from his 1942 gross income (assuming A reports on a
calendar year basis), or for his taxable year in which June 30,
1942, falls (if he reports on a basis other than the calendar year).
This part of the amendment of I.R.C., Section 116(a), applies
to taxable years beginning in 1942 as well as to those beginning
after December 31, 1942.126
l22For cases construing this provision, see Muhleman v. Hoey, (1942)
124 Fed. (2d) 414) ; Com'r of Int. Revenue v. Fiske's Estate, (1942) 128
Fed. (2d) 487.
1231. R. C., sec. 116(a) (1), as amended by R. A. 1942. sec. 148(a).
121R. A. 1942, sec. 148(b).
125I.R.C., sec. 116(a) (2), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 148(a).
126R. A. 1942, sec. 148(b).
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Deductions-Expenses
All federal income tax acts have permitted the deduction of ordi-
nary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business. 27 There have been
numerous cases in which the deductibility of an expense item
turned on whether the activity in connection with which it had
been incurred constituted "carrying on a trade or business." The
courts tended to give this phrase a rather narrow construction.
Thus the owner of extensive investments in securities in connec-
tion with whose management and conservation he incurred ex-
penses was held not entitled to deduct those expenses since those
activities did not constitute carrying on a trade or business. 28 The
effect of this, and other similar, decisions has now been eliminated,
but only in the case of individual taxpayers. 2 9 These may now
deduct "all ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year for the production or collection of income,
or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property
held for the production of income." The scope of the change will
depend upon who is deemed an "individual." The estate of a
decedent will probably be held such. 30 If so, it will be permitted
to take such deductions, if they are of the type deductible under
Section 812(b) of the I.R.C. (deduction for expenses, etc., in
computing the decedent's net estate), only if the estate files a
statement that they have not been claimed or allowed as deductions
in computing the net estate, and a waiver of the right to have them
allowed at any time in computing the net estate.' 3' It will probably
also be held to include a trust established by an individual, even
though the trustee be a corporation.'3 2 It is only by such a construc-
tion that the evil aimed at can be wholly remedied. The deduction
for depreciation, heretofore limited to property used in trade or
business, is also broadened to include "property held for the pro-
duction of income." 3 3 If any such deductions are allocable
against interest wholly exempt from federal income taxes, they
may not be deducted even though no such interest was received
127I. R. C., sec. 23(a).
1*IHiggins v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, (1941) 312 U. S. 212, 61 S.
Ct. 475, 85 L. Ed. 783.
'2PI. R. C., sec. 23(a) (2). added by R. A. 1942, sec. 121(a).1 r'.For prior law, see U. S. v. Pyne, (1941) 313 U. S. 127, 61 S. Ct.
893, 85 L. Ed. 1231.
132I. R. C., sec. 162(e), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 161.
'-
2 For prior law, see City Bk. Farmers Trust Co. v. Helvering, (1941)
313 U. S. 121, 61 S. Ct. 896, 85 L. Ed. 1227.
2,1I.R.C., see. 23(1), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 121 (c).
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or accrued during the taxable .year.-34 The foregoing amendments
are applicable to taxable years beginning after December 31,
1938,185 and are made part of the Revenue Act of 1938 and all
prior revenue Acts." 6 Thisaffords some taxpayers an opportunity
to obtain tax refunds or credits ,for prior years that are still open.
Deductions-Taxes
R. A. 1942 has maide several important changes in the law
governing the deduction of taxes paid or accrued. In the past the
right to deduct taxes has been limited to the person upon whom
they are imposed or, ii'the case of property taxes payable only out
of the property, to the owner thereof. The mere fact that a vendor
added the tax to his price 'did not permit the vendee to deduct the
tax if it was one imposed upon the vendor. Exceptions have now
been made to this principle. 3 The tax must be one imposed by
A state, territory, the District of Columbia, or a possession of
the United States, or any political subdivision thereof. It must
be one imposed upon persons (a) engaged in selling tangible
personal property at retail, or (b) engaged in furnishing services
at retail. In case (a) it must be one measured by the gross sale
price of the article or the gross receipts from the sale, or be a
stated sum per unit of the property sold (e.g., 2 cents per pound
of sugar). In case (b), supra, the tax must be measured by the
gross receipts for furnishing the service. A condition to the pur-
chaser's right to take the deduction is that the amount of the tax be
separately stated. He may deduct it to the extent that he pays
the amount so stated in the same manner as if it had been a tax
imposed upon and paid by him. It is apparently not essential
that the purchaser pay the whole amount separately stated by
the vendor as such tax, and it is not clear whether the vendor
must separately state the whole of such tax. A purchaser buying
such articles or services in connection with his trade or business
may not take this deduction. The whole price paid by him, in-
cluding the tax, is deductible by him as a business expense. This
prohibition does not apply where the purchaser acquires the article
or services in connection with an economic activity the expenses
connected with which are deductible under the amendment dis-
cussed in the preceding section.
An equally important departure from the principle that only
1341.R.C., sec. 24(a) (5), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 121(b).
135R. A. 1942, sec. 121 (d).
:16R. A. 1942, sec. 121(e).
1371.R.C., sec. 22(c) (3), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 122.
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he may deduct a tax upon whom it is imposed was enacted as a
measure of justice to tenant-stockholders of co-operative apart-
ment corporations.13 8 Such corporation must meet certain defi-
nitely prescribed qualifications. It may have but one class of out-
standing stock. All its stockholders must be entitled, solely by
reason of their ownership of its stock, to occupy for dwelling
purposes apartments in a building owned or leased by it. They
must not be entitled, either conditionally or unconditionally, to
receive any capital distribution except upon a complete or partial
liquidation of the corporation. Finally 80 per cent or more of the
corporate gross income for its taxable year in which the taxes
(and interest) are paid or incurred must be derived from tenant-
stockholders. The amendment also contains a definition of the
term "tenant-stockholder" so formulated as to restrict the right
to this deduction to bona fide tenants. It is defined to mean an
individual who is a stockholder in such corporation, and whose
stock is fully paid up in an amount not less than that which bears
a reasonable relationship to that part of the value of the corpora-
tion's equity in the building and the land on which it is situated
attributable to the apartment which he is entitled to occupy. If,
for example, such corporation's equity in its building and land is
$100,000, and a fair amount thereof attributable to the apart-
ment that A is entitled to occupy is $5,000, then he would clearly
meet this condition if his stock were fully paid up in an amount
approximating $5,000. It may be that the requirements for meet-
ing this condition will be stated in terms of a comparison of the
ratio that the value of his apartment bears to the corporation's
equity and the ratio that the amount of his paid-up shares bear
to the total of such paid-up shares outstanding. The Commissioner
is given a wide discretion with respect to this matter. The only
tax entering into the computation of this deduction by a tenant-
stockholder is the real estate tax paid or accrued by the corpora-
tion for the tenant-stockholder's taxable year on its building and
the land on which it is situated. He may deduct such part thereof
as the stock owned by him is of the corporation's total outstanding
stock, including that held by the corporation. The right to the
deduction exists only where such amount is not otherwise de-
ductible by him."'3
I-1I.R.C., sec. 23(z), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 128.
13f'The principles herein discussed with respect to taxes of co-operative
apartment corporations also apply to "interest paid or incurred by the cor-
poration on its indebtedness contracted in the acquisition, construction,
alteration, rehabilitation, or maintenance of such apartment building, or in
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Three other changes made in the provisions of the I.R.C. relat-
ing to the deduction for taxes require brief mention. The excess
profits tax is no longer deductible in computing corporate net
income for normal and surtax purposes." 0  The repeal of the
former provision allowing its deduction reflects the fact that the
latter taxes are now based on amounts of corporate net income
reduced by the income used in computing the excess profits tax.1'1
Another change relates to the deduction of income and profits
taxes paid to any foreign country or to a possession of the United
States. These were formerly deductible unless the taxpayer signi-
fied in his return that he elected to use them to any extent as a
credit against his tax. They are now non-deductible if he chooses
to credit them to any extent against his tax.1 42 The change is
.purely formal. Lastly, formerly taxpayers were given an option to
deduct or capitalize taxes and other carrying charges on unim-
proved and unproductive real property, but there was no express
statutory provision excluding amounts thus capitalized from de-
ductions. This omission has now been cured. 143  That change
merely gives statutory expression to what was already the law.
However, the amendment uses the term "property" instead of
"unimproved and unproductive real property," and this change
has undoubtedly modified the law somewhat. The provisions
relating to the loss or gain basis are also amended to reflect this
changeY.
44
Deductions-Bad Debts
Under prior laws a bad debt was deductible in th- taxable year
in which it was ascertained to be worthless and charged off.
Partial write-offs were allowable if the Commissioner was satisfied
that a debt was recoverable only in part. He might also permit
taxpayers to use the reserve method under which the amount of
deduction for any taxable year was limited to a reasonable addition
to the bad debt reserve for that year.'4 No change has been made
with respect to the employment of the reserve method. Amend-
ments have been made with respect to the other two. The reason
the acquisition of the land on which the building is located." I.R.C., sec.
23(z), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 128.140I.R.C., sec. 23(c) (1) (B), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 105(c),
and I.R.C., sec. 23(c) (2), repealed thereby.
S41I.R.C., sec. 13(a) (2), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 105 (a) ; I.R.C.,
sec. 15, as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 105 (b).
421.R.C., sec. 23(c) (1) (C), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 158(b).
1431.R.C., sec. 24(7), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 130(a).
1441.R.C., sec. 113(b) (1) (A), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 130(b).
"'1See I.R.C., sec. 23(k).
REV'ENUE ACT OF 1942
for these changes is to be found in the risks to which taxpayers
were exposed in taking this deduction as a result of judicial deci-
sions and administrative practices. The ascertainment of worth-
lessness and the charge-off had to occur in the same taxable year.
The cases were in conflict as tb whether the provision imposed
a subjective or objective test of worthlessness. 146 As a result tax-
payers frequently were wholly debarred from taking a deduction
for particular debts that in fact had become bad during some
taxable year. The recent amendment no longer requires either
that the debt be ascertained to be worthless or be charged off.
A bad debt is now deductible if it becomes worthless during the
taxable year, or, in the case of a debt not bad in its entirety, the
Commissioner may allow a deduction in an amount not in excess
of the part which becomes worthless during the taxable year.- 7
The exception from this principle of debts evidenced by a security
is retained without change. "Security" is defined as before, but the
loss with respect to such debts is a capital loss in the taxable year
when they become worthless instead of in that in which they are
ascertained to become worthless and are charged off. 4'
The former law made no distinction between business debts
and non-business debts. This has been changed with respect to all
taxpayers other than corporations. 49 A taxpayer, other than a
corporation. may no longer deduct a non-business bad debt as a
bad debt. If such a debt becomes worthless during a taxable year,
such taxpayer must treat it as a short-term capital loss. A "non-
business debt" is defined as a debt other than one evidenced by a
security (as defined in I.R.C., Sec. 23(k) (3) ) and other than
one the loss from the worthlessness of which is incurred in a
taxpayer's trade or business. Thus a debt loss by a taxpayer incurred
in connection with his activities in managing his own investments
would be a loss with respect to a non-business debt unless it were
one evidenced by a security. If the latter were the case, its loss
would be governed by the general provisions of Section 23(k)
of the I.R.C. applicable to debts evidenced by a security.
14See 'Mayer Tank Mfg. Co. v. Com'r of Int. Revenue, (1942) 126 Fed.
(2d) 588; Rosenthal v. Helvering, (1941) 124 Fed. (2d) 474.
1171.R.C., sec. 23(k), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 124(a).
'
11-For a special provision relating to bad debt deductions of insurance
companies, other than life or mutual, see 1. R. Co., sec. 204(c) (6), as
amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 124(b). For a special provision relating to the
treatment of losses incurred in connection with debts evidenced by securities
issued by any corporation affiliated with the taxpayer, see I.R.C., sec. 23(k)
(5), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 124(a) ; this is effective only with respect to
taxable years beginning after December 31, 1941.
141I.RC., sec. 23(k) (4), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 124(a).
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This amendment relating to non-business debts is effective
only with respect to taxable years beginning after December
31, 1942, while the other amendments discussed above are effective
with respect to all taxable years beginning after December 31,
1938.150 A special seven year petiod is provided for filing claims
for credit or refund based on the treatment of bad debt deductions
or capital losses covered by the above discussion. 51 No interest is,
however, allowed on such claims. 52
Deductions-Depletion
The only changes made in the provisions of the I.R.C. relating
to depletion are as follows: (1) the addition of several types of
wasting assets with respect to which depletion may not be com-
puted on the basis of discovery value ;153 (2) the inclusion of those
types of wasting assets among those with respect to which deple-
tion may be taken on the percentage of gross basis; and (3) the
elimination of the provisions requiring taxpayers to make an
election as a condition to employing the method referred to
in (2)., 54 The net effect of (3) is to permit taxpayers entitled
to use method (2) to deduct depletion on the basis of the per-
centage of gross method or on the basis of cost, whichever is the
greater, and to do so for each taxable year beginning after
December 31, 1941.
Deductions-nAmortizable Bond Premiums
A purchaser who buys a bond at a premium will receive only
its par value if he holds it till maturity, or, if he holds it until
called or redeemed,, its call or redemption value. He will, in the
former situation, and may, in the latter, receive less than he paid
for it. Under prior tax laws, as construed by Regulations and
decisions, he would be entitled to treat the excess of what he paid
for the bond over what he received on its maturity, or when called
or redeemed, as a loss incurred in the year it matured, or was
called or redeemed. A new provision has been added to the I.R.C.
that makes important changes in the treatment of bond
premiums.'" The new method is intended to apply to all bonds.
12OR. A. 1942, sec. 124(d).
I.R.C., sec. 322(b) (2), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 169(a). This
applies also to capital losses under I.R.C., sec. 23(g) (2).
15I.R.C., sec. 3771(d), added by R.A. 1942, sec. 124(c).
171I.R.C., sec. 114(b) (2), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 145(b).
1541.R.C., sec. 114(b) (4), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 145(a).
155I.R.C., sec. 23(v), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 126(a) ; and I.R.C., sec.
125, added by R. A. 1942, sec. 126(b).
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The term "bond" in effect includes any debt, evidenced by a
security, if the obligor is a corporation, a government, or a political
subdivision of the latter.'5" It does not include any such obligation
if it constitutes stock in trade for the taxpayer, if held by him
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade
or business, or if of a kind properly includible in his inventory
if it were owned by him at the close of his taxable year. The
latter provisions probably apply only to dealers in securities. The
application of the new method demands some basis for computing
(a) the total bond premium, and (b) the amortizable bond
premium attributable to any given taxable year. The total bond
premium equals the excess of the loss basis of the bond in the
hands of the taxpayer over the amount payable on its maturity
or earlier call date, minus an amount that reflects the amount that
would have been amortizable prior to the date on which this new
section takes effect (i.e., prior to the first date of the taxpayer's
taxable year beginning after December 31, 1941).157 For example,
if A (assumed to report on a calendar year basis) had purchased a
$1,000 bond on January 1, 1937, for $1,100, having 20 more years
to run after the date of purchase, then the total bond premium
that he may amortize for taxable years beginning after December
31, 1941, would be ($1,100 - $1,000) - (%oths of $100) = $75.
The amortizable bond premium for a given taxable year is the
amount of that $75 attributable to that year. $ If A be assumed to
amortize the premium equally over the years between his acquisi-
tion of the bond and its maturity (the assumption made in com-
puting the $75), then his annual amortizable bond premium will
equal $5. The amendment provides that both the total bond
premium and the annual amortizable amount thereof shall be
computed in accordance with the method regularly employed by
the bondholder if that is reasonable, or in accordance with regula-
tions prescribed by the Commissioner.5 9
The bonds to which the new method applies are divided into
three classes as follows:
1. Those the interest on which is wholly excludible from gross
income (e.g., those issued by a state).
2. Those the interest on which is wholly includible in gross
income.
3. Those the interest on which is includible in gross income but
356I.R.C., sec. 125(d), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 126(b).
1-71.R.C., see. 125(b) (1), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 126(b).
l-sI.R.C., sec. 125(b) (2), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 126(b)
I CI.R.C., sec. 125(b) (3), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 126(b).
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which constitutes a credit against net income in computing
an individual's normal tax net income, or a corporation's
adjusted income (e.g., interest on a United States bond
exempt from normal tax).
The treatment accorded bond premium depends on to which of
said classes the bond belongs.
The treatment in the case of a bond whose interest is wholly
excludible from gross income is as follows. The amortizable bond
premium is not deductible. 160 It is, however, treated as an adjust-
ment of the bond's gain or loss basis.'' The adjustment operates
by way of a reduction of that basis. An* example may make this
clearer. Assume that A buys a 20 year bond issued by State B,
bearing 4 per cent interest; that he bought it on its issue on
January 1, 1937; that he paid $1,100 for a $1,000 bond; and that
he reports on a calendar year basis. His total bond premium
(computed as above outlined) is $75. The amortizable bond
premium, which he is, however, not allowed to deduct, is $5 for
the taxable year 1942 and each taxable year thereafter during the
whole of which he owns the bond (a fraction thereof if he holds
it for part only of such taxable year). If he holds it until ma-
turity, the disallowed deduction will total $75. His unadjusted
loss basis with respect to the bond is $1,100. This must be reduced
by $75, the amount of unallowed bond premium amortization.
His loss, therefore, becomes $1,025-$1,000, or $25. The effect
upon his position for the whole period of his ownership of the
bond is as follows. During the 20 years of his ownership he has
collected $800 of wholly exempt interest. He paid the $100 pre-
mium because the nominal interest rate on the bond was greater
than the rate of return demanded by him. Amortization is a
method for adjusting the amount received annually to the effec-
tive rate of return demanded by A. The statutory method in this
case quite rightly denies A the privilege of deducting the $5 for
each taxable year since no part of the amount received by him as
interest on the bond is income for tax purposes. However, the
reduction of his gain or loss basis by the amount of the non-allow-
able deduction decreases the amount of his loss, or increases the
amount of his gain, in the same amount as was disallowed, in the
year that the bond matured (or was sold by A). If the taxable
period were the whole period of A's ownership of the bond, his net
income would be greater by the amount of the non-deductible
160I.R.C., sec. 125(a) (2), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 126(b).
161I.R.C., sec. 113(b) (1) (H), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 126(c).
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amortizable bond premium. This would be exactly the result had
the law required the wholly exempt interest for that 20 year period
to be computed on the basis of the effective rate earned by A on
his investment in that bond rather than on the basis of the nom-
inal interest rate borne by the bond. The constitutionality of
this provision might once have been assailed as an indirect method
of taxing the exempt interest. It is, however, a reasonable method
for adjusting the amount of the exempted, interest to the amount
of the true interest which such a bond holder receives on his in-
vestment in the bonds. It does reduce the value of the exemption.
The treatment of bond premium in the case of a bond the
interest on which is wholly includible in gross income differs from
the case just discussed. The amount of the amortizable bond pre-
mium for the taxable year is deductible. The aggregate of the
amounts so deducted during the taxable year beginning after De-
ceniber 31, 1941, and subsequent taxable years, is deducted from
the bond's gain or loss basis. If the bond in the example given in
the preceding paragraph had been that of a private corporation
but all other facts were assumed to be the same as therein, then
the amortizable bond premium for A's taxable year 1942 and sub-
sequent years would be $5. The annual nominal interest that A
would receive would be $40. The deduction of the $5 amortizable
bond premium would mean that the net accretion to A's income
for each such taxable year was $35. It is in effect treating the
$5 as a recovery of that much of A's investment in that bond.
Consequently his basis for computing loss (or, in case of a sale be-
fore maturity, his gain or loss basis) should be reduced by the
aggregate amount of such capital recoveries. This is exactly what
the new method requires. 1 2 The same method of treatment ap-
ilies also to those bonds heretofore described as belonging to class
(3), supra. There is, however, one further feature applicable
only to that class of bonds. The interest on them is a credit against
net income in arriving at an individual's normal tax net income,
and in arriving at a corporate taxpayer's adjusted net income. The
theory on which amortizable bond premium is deductible is that
its deduction corrects an overstatement of the bondholder's in-
terest income by the amount of such deduction. The credits
against net income mentioned above should be limited to the
amount of interest effectively included in the taxpayer's gross in-
113LI.R.C., sec. 125(a)(1), added by R. A. 1942. sec. 126(b), and
I.R.C., sec. 113(b) (1) (H), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 126(c).
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come, not to the nominal amount of such interest. Hence these
credits should also be reduced by the amount of the amortizable
bond premium for the taxable year in question. This is what the
new law requires.1613
-There remains one further consideration. The method de-
scribed above for treating the premium on a bond whose interest
is wholly excludible from gross income is compulsory for every
class of taxpayer. A taxpayer other than a corporation need
employ it with respect to all other types of bond only if he elects
to do so. If he elects to do so, he must employ it for all such
bonds held by him at the beginning of the first taxable year to
which the election applies and to all such bonds subsequently ac-
quired by him. An election is binding for all subsequent years
unless the Commissioner permits a change. The partnership alone
may make this election for a member of a partnership with respect
to such bonds owned by the partnership. A corporation is given
an election only with respect to bonds other than those the in-
terest on which can be used as a credit against net income in
computing its adjusted net income. The manner and effect of an
election by it are the same as those applying to non-corporate
taxpayers.16 4 There appears to be no requirement in the new pro-
vision that the right to take a deduction for amortizable bond
premium exists only in those taxable years when the taxpayer
receives interest on such bond.
Deductioni-Amortization of Emergency Facilities
The provision for the amortization of emergency facilities was
introduced into the I.R.C. by the Second Revenue Act of 1940.
The election to take this deduction was originally restricted to
corporations. It is now made available to every personY3 5 The
election may now be made with respect to emergency facilities
completed or acquired after December 31, 1939, instead of with
respect to those completed or acquired after June 10, 1940 (as
163I.R.C., sec. 125(a)(3), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 126(b). Special
rules for the treatment of this credit adjustment are provided for the
following classes of taxpayers: (1) Estates. trusts, and the beneficiaries
thereof; I.R.C., sec. 163(c), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 126(d) ; (2) Par-
ticipants in common trust funds; I.R.C., sec. 169 (c) (2), as amended by
R. A. 1942, sec. 126(e); (3) Partners; I.R.C., sec. 184, as amended by
R. A. 1942, sec. 126(f); (4) United States shareholders in foreign per-
sonal holding companies; I.R.C., sec. 337(c), as amended by R. A. 1942,
sec. 126(g) ; (5) Shareholders in personal service corporation; I.R.C., see.
394(c), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 126(h).
1641.R.C., sec. 125(c), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 126(b).
1651.R.C., sec. 124(a), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 155(a).
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originally provided).'16 A life tenant is entitled to take this de-
duction as if he were the absolute owner of the facility.167 It is
also made available to estates and trusts,168 and to partnerships.16
The amendments made by R.A. 1942 are made effective as of
October 8, 1940, the date of enactment of the Second Revenue
Act of 1940.170 Refunds and credits resulting from giving the
amendments this retroactive effect shall be made without interest.17"
Deductiois-War Losses
Space and time limitations prevent the discussion of this new
deduction allowed taxpayers. 172 It deserves, however, to be called
to the attention of the bar. This amendment of the I.R.C. is ap-
plicable to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1940.17
Deductios-Pension Trusts
The provisions of Section 2 3(p) of the I.R.C., relating to the
deduction by an employer of contributions to a pension trust
maintained for the benefit of his employees, have been completely
overhauled. 174 The amendments reflect an equally important series
-f amendments to the I.R.C. section relating to pension trusts. 75
These changes are also responsible for an addition of a new sub-
paragraph to Section 22(b) (2) of the I.R.C. which deals explicity
with the treatment by an employee of amounts received by him
under certain annuities purchased by his employerY.7 6 The changes
referred to in this paragraph are too extensive to permit of more
than this mere reference to them. 7
Net Operating Loss Deduction
The Revenue Act of 1939 reintroduced into the federal income
tax system the provision according taxpayers the right to carry
over into subsequent years the net operating losses of a given
taxable year. T1 7 ' The new law amends this section to provide for
carrying back the net operating loss of a given taxable year to the
"11q.R.C., sec. 124(e), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 155(d).
11,7I.R.C.. sec. 124(i). added by R. A. 1942. sec. 155(f).
1"1I.R.C., sec. 172. added by R. A. 1942, sec. 155(g).
I'"I.R.C.. see. 190, added by R. A. 1942, sec. 155(h).
170R. A. 1942, sec. 155(i).171R. A. 1942, sec. 155(j).172I.R.C., sec. 127, added by R. A. 1942, sec. 156(a).
17,R. A. 1942, sec. 156(b).
I¢7I.R.C., sec. 23(p), as amendnd by R. A. 1942, sec. 162(b).
W I.R.C., see. 165, as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 162(a).
xr6I.R.C., sec. 22(b) (2) (B), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 162(c).
177As to the taxable years to which these amendments are applicable,
see R. A. 1942, sec. 162(d).
17"I. R. C., sec. 122, added by Revenue Act of 1939, sec. 211(b).
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two preceding taxable years and permitting amounts thereof not
offset by the net income of those years to be carried forward to
the two succeeding taxable years.179 A net operating loss may not
be carried back to any taxable year beginning prior to January 1,
1941.180 If, therefore, a taxpayer on a calendar year basis has a
net operating loss for 1942, he may carry it back only into his
taxable year 1941.
The necessary effect of the new provision is to affect the tax-
able net income of the years to which the net operating loss de-
duction of a given taxable year may be carried back, just as the
effect of the prior law was to affect the taxable net income of the
subsequent years to which the net operating loss of a given year
could be carried forward. However, the first thing to be computed
is the net operating loss for a given taxable year which is to be
carried back to prior years, or forward to subsequent taxable
years. There has been no substantial change in its definition. It
means the excess of the deductions allowed by the income tax
chapter of the I.R.C. over the gross income, with certain adjust-
ments.' 8' Four of the five existing adjustments have not been
changed. 182 That relating to capital gains and capital losses has
been amended to reflect changes in the treatment of such gains
and losses. These are still required to be taken into account with-
out regard to the percentage limitations prescribed in Section
117(b) of the I.R.C., but a change has been made in defining the
extent of the deductibility of such losses. The amount deductible
on account of such losses may not exceed the amount includible
on account of such gains.182a The limitation was formerly stated
separately for both long-term and short-term capital gains and
losses. The adjustment by way of deducting the excess profits
tax is new,1 8 3 but it merely reflects the fact that this is no longer
a permissible deduction in computing a corporation's net income. T"M
179I.R.C., sec. 122(b), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 153(a).
11OI.R.C., sec. 122(e), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 153(c).
1LlI.R.C., sec. 122(a), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 105(e).
182These are (1) that the depletion deduction shall not exceed that
allowable if it were computed without regard to discovery value or the "per-
centage of gross" method; (2) that wholly tax free interest shall be in-
cluded in gross income in the amount by which it exceeds the non-deductible
interest paid on loans made to carry tax-exempt obligations; (3) that no
net operating loss deduction shall be allowed; and (4) that non-business
deductions shall (in case of all but corporate taxpayers) be allowed only
to the extent of non-business income.
l,2aI.R.C., sec. 122(d) (4), as amended by R. A. 1942, see. 150(e).
183I.R.C., sec. 122(d) (6), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 105(e) (3) (C).
184R. A. 1942, sec. 105(c) (2).
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The most important changes in Section 122 of the I.R.C. have
been made in subsection (b) thereof. The first of them concerns
the "net operating loss carry back." It prescribes the rules in ac-
cordance with which the net operating loss of a given taxable year
is to be carried back to the preceding two taxable years. The
statute mentions a "first preceding taxable year" and a "second
preceding taxable year," but does not expressly define to which of
the years in the two-year period each of these terms refers. How-
ever, it does state that the carry-back for the first preceding tax-
able year shall be the excess of the net operating loss over the net
income for the second preceding taxable year.18 5 If the aim of the
statute is to afford the maximum possible relief, then the first
preceding taxable year will mean the taxable year immediately
preceding the taxable year in which the net operating loss oc-
curred. An example will clarify this matter. Assume that A (who
reports on a calendar year basis) has a $5,000 net operating loss
for 1943, a net income of $4,000 for 1942, and a net income of
$2,000 for 1941. If the first preceding taxable year is 1942, then
the carry back to it is $5,000-$2,000, or $3,000. The net operating
loss of 1943 is then carried back as follows: to 1941, $2,000, and
to 1942, $3,000, leaving $1,000 of 1942 net income available for
offsetting any net operating loss for 1944. If, however, 1941 be
taken as the first preceding taxable year, then the carry back to it
is $5,000-$4,000 or $1,000. The net operating loss of 1943 is then
carried back as follows: to 1941. $1,000, and to 1942, $4,000, thus
leaving $1,000 of 1941 net income never useable as an offset to the
net operating loss for any taxable year. It may, therefore, be
safely asserted that the first preceding taxable year is that im-
mediately preceding that whose net operating loss is being carried
back.
The change in treating net operating losses has required an
amendment of the provisions relating to the "net operating loss
carry-over." The carry-over period, remains as before, being the
two taxable years succeeding that in which the net operating loss
occurred. The carry-over to the second succeeding taxable year
is defined as the excess of such net operating loss over the net
' 5This net income must be computed by making all of the adjustments
required in computing a net operating loss except that relating to non-
business deductions, but the net operating loss deduction for such second
preceding taxable year must be computed without regard to the net operating
loss that is being carried back to it (i.e., the net operating loss of the taxable
year 1943 in the illustration given in the text).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
income of the first succeeding taxable year. 8s The net operating
loss must, however, also be reduced by the sum of the net incomes
for each of the two taxable years preceding that whose net operat-
ing loss is being carried over.5 7 These will be the two taxable
years to which part of that same net operating loss will already
have been carried back, since the carry-over provision operates
only in cases in which the loss has not been wholly offset against
the two preceding taxable years. The effect of this is to prevent
any part of such loss from being twice offset against the net in-
come of other years. s-' An example may aid in clarifying this
whole matter. Assume that A (a taxpayer reporting on the calen-
dar year basis) had a $2,000 net income in 1941, $3,000 net income
in 1942, a $7,000 net operating loss in 1943, $1,000 net income in
1944, and $3,000 net income in 1945. His carry-back and carry-
over amounts for the years involved will be as follows: (1) a
$2,000 carry-back to 1941; (2) a $3,000 carry-back to 1942;1""
(3) this leaves $2,000 to be carried forward into 1944 and 1945;
(4) the amount that may be carried over to 1945 is (a) $7,000
(total net operating loss for 1943)-$1,000 (net income for 1944,
the first taxable year succeeding 1943)-$5,000 (the sum of the
net incomes of 1941 and 1942, which have already been used to
offset an equal amount of the $7,000 net loss) ; (5) the result of
the computations in (4) gives $1,000, the amount that may be
carried over to 1945; (6) which leaves $1,000 (equal to the 1944
net income) as the carry-over to 1944. The result is that the whole
of the $7,000 net operating loss for 1943 has either been carried
back or carried over to other years.
The result of the operations considered in the two preceding
paragraphs is to determine the net operating loss carry-back for
186The net income for such first succeeding taxable year is defincd
as in footnote 185, except that in computing its net operating loss deduction
any net operating loss carry-back to it is disregarded. This modification
is to take care of the case in which there is a net operating loss for a
taxable year subsequent to it which loss can be to any extent carried back
to it.
037The net income for each of the preceding two taxable years is, for
this purpose, computed in the manner described in footnote 185, except
that the net operating loss deduction for each of them is computed without
regard to the net operating loss being carried over and the net operating
loss for the taxable year succeeding that in which was incurred the net
operating loss which is being carried over. The net operating loss for such
succeeding taxable year might be carried back to the first taxable year pre-
ceding that whose loss is being carried over under the net operating loss
carry-back provisions.
"S'This works an injustice with respect to a net operating loss for 1942
unless it is wholly offset against 1941 net income.
I'RO- to (1) and (2) see preceding paragraph.
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each of the two years preceding that in which a net operating loss
was incurred, and the net operating carry-over for each of the two
taxable years succeeding the year of the loss. A taxable year may
be one to which a part of the net operating loss of a subsequent
year has been carried back, and at the same time one to which a
part of the net operating loss of a prior taxable year may have
been carried over. The aggregate amount of the net operating
loss carry-backs and carry-overs are the starting point for com-
puting the net operating loss deduction for that year. This is re-
duced, in the case of a non-corporate taxpayer, by the excess of
the net income, computed with the adjustments provided for in
subsection 122(d) (1), (2), (3) and 4, over the net income, com-
puted without the net operating loss deduction which is being de-
termined. The reduction, in the case of a corporation, is the ex-
cess of its net income, similarly adjusted, over its normal-tax net
income, computed without the net operating loss deduction and
without the credit for income subject to excess profits tax. This
gives the amount of the net operating loss deduction for any tax-
able year.1" ' The following example (taking the case of a non-
corporate taxpayer) will illustrate these principles. Assume that
during the calendar year 1944 A (who reports on a calendar year
basis) has a net income (before taking the net operating loss
deduction) equal to $100,000; that the net loss carry-back to it
with respect to a net operating loss for 1945 is $10,000, and for
1946 $5,000: and that the net operating loss carry-over to it with
respect to a net operating loss for 1942 is $2,000, and for 1943 is
$3,000. The aggregate of these net operating loss carry-backs and
carry-overs for 1944 is thus $20,000. The next thing necessary is
to determine its net income as affected by the required adjust-
ments. For the sake of simplicity we will assume that the only
adjustment that has to be made is for $4,000 of wholly exempt
interest received by A during 1944. He is required to add this to
his net income, thus making his income, as adjusted, $104,000.
This is $4,000 in excess of his 1944 net income, computed without
the net operating loss deduction. The $20,000 mentioned above
has to be reduced by this $4,000. The net operating loss deduc-
tion for 1944 is thus $16,000. The effect of the reduction in this
case is to require A to offset a part of his net loss against his
exempt income, which, while not taxable, is a part of his total
1944 income.
19I.R.C., sec. 122(c), as amended by R. A. 1942, secs. 105(e) and
153(b).
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One effect of these amendments is to leave each taxable year
subject to a recomputation of its tax on the basis of events oc-
curring during the two succeeding taxable years. Claims for re-
fund or credit for overpayments attributable to carry-backs to
such year of net operating losses of subsequent years do not bear
interest. 191 All the amendments discussed in this section apply
only to taxable years beginning after December 31, 1940. 12
Deductions-Charitable, Etc., Contributions
The changes in the provisions governing this matter have been
slight. The prior 15 per cent limit on this deduction, in the case
of individuals, was based on net income computed without this
deduction. 193 It is now based on net income computed without
this deduction and the deduction for medical expenses.19 4 The
charitable deduction provision applicable to corporations has been
amended in two respects."9 5 It now includes gifts to the United
States, any State, Territory, or any political subdivision thereof,
the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States,
for exclusively public purposes. The second change provides that
the requirement that gifts to trusts, chests, funds or foundations
be for use within the United States or any of its possessions, shall
apply only if the payment of the gift is made within a taxable year
beginning after the date of the cessation of hostilities in the pres-
ent war, as proclaimed by the President.
Deductions-Medical Expenses
The new law introduces a deduction for medical expenses into
the federal income tax system for the first time. 19 6 An expense of
this character is deductible only if paid during the taxable year
when taken, regardless of the taxpayer's method of reporting. It
includes all expenses paid for the medical care of the taxpayer, his
spouse, or a dependent with respect to whom he is entitled to the
dependent's credit against net income. He may not include any
amount for which he is compensated by insurance or otherwise.
The term "medical care" is liberally defined. It includes amounts
paid for diagnosis, cure. mitigation, treatment, or prevention of
disease, or for the purpose of affecting any structure or function
of the body, and also amounts paid for accident or health insur-
191I.R.C., sec. 3771(e), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 153(d).
192R. A. 1942, sec. 153(e).
1931.R.C., sec. 23(o).
1941.R.C., sec. 23(o), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 127(c).
1°5I.R.C., sec. 23(q), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 125.196I.R.C., sec. 23(x), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 127(a).
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ance. The amount of the deduction is, however, limited. An in-
dividual filing a separate return may deduct only such part of
these expenses as exceed 5 per cent of his net income (computed
without this deduction), but in no case may the deduction exceed
$2,500 in the case of the head of a family, or $1,250 in the case of
all other individuals. If a husband and wife file a joint return,
the deduction is only of such amount as exceeds 5 per cent of their
aggregate net income (computed without this deduction), but may
in no case exceed $2,500 for any taxable year. The amounts de-
ductible hereunder are expressly excluded from non-deductible
living expenses.'". The allowance of this deduction has also neces-
sitated an amendment of the provision excluding from gross in-
come compensation received for injuries or sickness. There has
now to be eliminated therefrom amounts attributable to (but not
in excess of) this deduction in any prior taxable year.19 8 As-
sume that A should recover $500 during the taxable year 1943
under a health insurance policy with respect to an illness during
1942, had paid the expenses thereof in 1942, and had had a $200
medical expense deduction for 1942. Under prior law this $500
would have been wholly excludible from his gross income for
1943. The amount excludible from his gross income for 1943
would now be reduced to $300. Had A recovered the $500 during
1942. the medical expenses for that year would have been com-
puted without including the expenses attributable to the illness
with respect to which he received said compensation since the new
Section 23(x) expressly permits inclusion of medical expenses
Only if they are not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
Non-Deductible Items
The only change involving non-deductible items in addition
ti those already noted is that relating to amounts paid or accrued
on indebtedness incurred or continued to purchase a single pre-
nium life insurance or endowment contract. 9  These amounts are
included among the items that are expressly non-deductible. The
phrase "single premium life insurance or endowment contract" is
given a broad meaning to reduce avoidance of this restriction. It
includes such contracts if substantially all the premiums thereon
are paid within a period of four years from the date on which
such contract is purchased. The language of this provision does
not require that the contract be on the life of the taxpayer. It
lf,7I.R.C., sec. 24(a), as amended by R. A. 1942. sec. 127(b).
1'AI.R.C., sec, 22(b) (5), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 127(d).
10 I.R.C., sec. 24(a) (6). added by R. A. 1942, sec. 129.
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applies if taken out by him on the life of another if the taxpayer
is directly or indirectly the beneficiary thereof. The test of includ-
ible contracts is the period during which the premiums are paid,
not that in which they are payable by the terms of the contract.
If A should take out a policy on his life on which the premiums
were payable in ten annual installments, and thereafter anticipate
the payment thereof and pay them within the four year period
mentioned above, the contract would be treated as a single pre-
mium contract. Had he borrowed to finance the premium pay-
ments, interest on those loans would appear to be non-deductible
for even those years during which the facts did not yet bring such
contract within the statutory definition of single premium policies.
That is, at least, a reasonably possible construction of this provi-
sion. The indebtedness must have been incurred or continued to
purchase such contract. It may be difficult in some cases to prove
the requisite connection between the incurring or carrying of a
particular indebtedness and the purchase of a contract of this
character. However, this is an issue that also arises in interpret-
ing and applying a similar requirement in the provision relating
to the deduction of interest.
2 0 0
Capital Gains and Losses
The Supreme Court long ago decided that capital gains con-
stituted income within the meaning of the 16th Amendment.201
The taxation of such gains has been an important factor con-
tributing to the complexity of the federal income tax system. Con-
gress has from time to time experimented with their taxation in
order to reduce some of the injustice of taxing in one year a gain
that might have accrued over a long period of years. Section 117
of the I.R.C. was its latest effort in this direction prior to the re-
cent amendments thereof. The starting point for the computations
required by this provision is the definition of the term "capital
asset." The new Act makes but one change therein. The prior
law excluded depreciable property used in a taxpayer's trade or
business. Since land is not depreciable property, it was treated as
a capital asset, although the buildings thereon were not such if
used in a trade or business. This has now been changed by ex-
20oSee I.R.C., sec. 23(b).
-O2"Merchant's Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, (1921) 255 U. S. 509,
41 S. Ct. 386, 65 L. Ed. 751.
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cluding from capital assets "real property used in a taxpayer's
trade or business. 20 2
Every capital asset is, as under prior law, either a short-term
or a long-term capital asset. The definition of those terms has
been changed. A short-term capital asset is one held for not more
than 6 months (formerly not more than 18 months), while a long-
term capital asset now means one held for more than 6 months
(formerly more than 18 months) .203 The percentages of the recog-
nized gain or loss required to be taken into account according as
the capital asset belongs to the one or the other of these classes
have been changed somewhat.20 4 That percentage remains 100 for
corporate taxpayers, and for short-term capital gains or losses of
other taxpayers. There is no longer a sub-classification of the
long-term capital gains or losses of non-corporate taxpayers 'with
respect to this matter. The percentage of gain or loss to be ac-
counted for is 50 per cent. The foregoing percentages apply in
computing net capital gain, net capital loss, and net income. If,
for example, A had sold a capital asset at a gain (or loss) of
$1,000, the whole amount would have entered into the computa-
tion of not only his net capital gain or loss but also of his net
income, had the asset been a short-term capital asset. Had it been
a long-term capital asset, the amount would have been $500. Had
A been a corporation, the amount would have been $1,000, whether
the asset had been a long-term or short-term capital asset.
Since the percentage of the gain or loss to be accounted for
depends upon the length of time that the taxpayer is treated as
having held the capital asset, the statute has provided certain rules
for computing the holding period.20 5 It includes not only the
period during which he held the particular asset sold, but also that
during which he held the asset whose gain or loss basis deter-
mines the gain or loss basis of the asset sold. Thus, if he sells
shares of stock in one corporation received in exchange for shares
of stock in another corporation, a party to a reorganization. in
the course of a reorganization, the period for which he is deemed
to have held the shares sold includes that for which he held the
shares given in exchange for those sold by him. Also, if he had
"'-I.R.C., sec. 117(a) (1). as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 151(a). See
further as to meaning of "capital asset," I.R.C., sec. 23(g) (4), added by
R. A. 1942, sec. 123(a), and I.R.C., sec. 23(k) (5), added by R. A. 1942,
sec. 124(a).
2hII.R.C., sec. 117(a), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 150(a).
2f1I.R.C., sec. 117(b), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 150(c).
2-1"I.R.C.. sec. 117(h).
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acquired the shares by gift, he would tack on to the period he him-
self had held them the period for which they were held by the
donor, or other person, whose gain or loss basis would constitute
his gain or loss basis with respect to those shares. The specific
instances in which such tacking is required under the prior law
are all retained, and new ones added. The first of these expressly
extends it to property acquired as an incident to the involuntary
conversion of other property under Section 112(b) of the I.R.C.2: "
The second of them relates to stock or securities acquired by the
taxpayer from a corporation by the exercise of rights to acquire
them. The amendment provides that the holding period shall
begin with the date upon which the right to acquire them was
exercised.2 0 7 Attention should be directed in connection with this
discussion of the holding period to the provisions of I.R.C., Sec-
tion 2 3(g) and 23(k). The former of these provides that a loss
incurred through securities (defined as corporate shares or rights
thereto) becoming worthless shall, if the securities are capital
assets, he treated as a capital loss occurring on the last day of the
taxable year in which they became worthless. The latter subsec-
tion applies the same rule to bonds, debentures, notes, or certifi-
cates, or other evidences of indebtedness, issued by a corporation,
or a government or political subdivision thereof. The last day of
such taxable year thus marks the end of the holding period with
respect to such securities or bonds, etc., regardless of the actual
day within that taxable year on which they became worthless.
The capital gain and loss provisions apply only where the
capital gain or loss results from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset. There have been many decisions on the question whether
the gain or loss did result from a sale or exchange or from a
method of disposing of the asset not includible in the category of
"sale or exchange." 205 The I.R.C. contained several provisions
expressly determining the status of certain methods of disposing
of capital assets.20 9 The new Act makes no general changes in
this matter. It does, however, add a special provision relating to
20oI.R.C., sec. 117(h) (1), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 151(c).
This amendment is made applicable to taxable years beginning after De-
cember 31, 1938.
2071.R.C., sec. 117(h) (6), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 152.208See Helvering v. Hammel, (1941) 311 U. S. 504, 61 S. Ct. 368, 85
I.. Ed. 303; AlcClain v. Com'r of Int. Revenue, (1941) 311 U. S. 527, 61
S. Ct. 373, 85 L. Ed. 319.2 0
oSee I.R.C., secs. 23(g) (shares of stock becoming worthless) ; 23(k)
(bonds, etc.. becoming worthless) ; 117(f) (gains or losses on retirement
of bonds, etc.) ; 117(g) (gains or losses from short sales).
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gains or losses from involuntary conversion and from the sale or
cxchange of certain other property used in trade or business.2 10 It
applies to the conversion, sale or exchange of assets that are ordi-
narily excluded from the class of capital assets. It secures this
result by defining "property used in trade or business" to include
depreciable property and real estate used in a trade or business if
it has been held for more than 6 months (excluding that held
primarily for sale to customers-in the ordinary course of the tax-
payer's trade or business). The method to be followed by a tax-
payer proceeding hereunder is as follows: (1) Compute the
amount of the recognized gain upon the sale or exchange of
..property used in the taxpayer's trade or business;" (2) compute
the amount of recognized gain from the compulsory or involun-
tary conversion of such property; (3) compute the amount of
the recognized gain211 from the compulsory or involuntary con-
version of capital assets; and (4) compute the amount of recog-
nized losses in transactions of the kind described in (1), (2), and
(3). -1' If the sum of items (1), and (2), and (3) is greater
than item (4). the gains and losses are treated as gains or losses
from the sale or exchange of capital assets. Tf the sum of items
(1), (2). and (3) equals or is less than item (4), the gains and
losses are not considered as gains or losses from the sale or ex-
change of capital assets. In the latter event they become ordinary
gains or losses, with the result that 100 per cent of such gains are
includible in gross income and the losses are fully deductible there-
from. A special provision has also been added to the I.R.C. for
the relief of banks as defined in Section 104 of the I.R.C. This
provides that if its losses from the sale or exchange of bonds, etc..
during any taxable year exceed the gains from the sale or ex-
change of bonds, etc., then no such sale or exchange shall be con-
sidered a sale or exchange of a capital asset.2 13 Such losses would
then be deductible without limit, even though the bondg, etc..
w,,uld be within the definition of long-term capital assets.
;.,-I.R.C.. sec. 117(j), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 151(b).
1
'As to extent of recognition of gains and losses on involuntary con-
verions of property, see I.R.C.. sec. 112(f), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec.
151(d), (e).
""'In computing the gains and losse.q mentioned in items (1), (2), (3)
and (4) in the text, compute them as if the purpose were to determine the
extent to which they would enter into the computation of net income, except
that the whole 100 per cent (instead of 50 per cent) of the gain or loss is
to be taken, and except that limitations upon the deductibility of capital
losses are io be ignored.
-'I.R.C., sce. 117(i). added by R. A. 1942, sec. 150(d).
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We have seen that the I.R.C., as amended, retains the distinc-
tion between short-term and long-term capital assets. It is also
still necessary to make separate computations of the amount of
the short-term capital gain and the short-term capital loss in order
to determine the amount of the net short-term capital gain or net
short-term capital loss. A change is made only in the definition
of "net short-term capital gain." This is now the excess of the
short-term capital gains over the short-term capital losses.214 Sep-
arate computations must also still be made of the amount of long-
term capital gain and long-term capital loss in order to determine
the net long-term capital gain and net long-term capital loss.
There have been, however, no changes in the definitions of these
terms. Two nev concepts have been developed in connection with
the new treatment of capital gains and losses. The first of these is
that of "net capital gain." 21  In the case of corporations it means
the excess of the gains from the sale or exchange of capital assets
over the losses therefrom during the same taxable year. In the
case of taxpayers other than corporations it means (1) the sum
of (a) gains from sale or exchange of capital assets and (b) the
taxpayer's net income2 16 or $1,000, whichever is the smaller, (2)
minus the losses from the sale or exchange of such assets during
the same taxable year. The second new concept is that of "net
capital loss." This is defined to mean the excess of the losses
from the sale or exchange of capital assets over the amount fixed
as the limit to the deduction of capital losses.217 That limit will be
discussed later. This concept derives its importance from the fact
that the right to the capital loss carry-over depends upon it.21' The
importance of the "net capital gain" concept will be considered
later.
The prior law permitted long-term capital losses to be de-
ducted in full in computing net income, requiring long-term
capital gains to be included in full in gross income. Short-term
214I.R.C., sec. 117(a) (6), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 150(a). The
prior law also required the net short-term capital loss of the prior year to
be deducted from the taxable year's short-term capital gains. The amend-
ment reflects the change in the capital loss carry-over provision (I.R.C.,
see. 117(d), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 150(c)).
213I.R.C., sec. 117(a) (10), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 150(b).
216Such net income is to be computed without regard to gains or losses
from sales or exchanges of capital assets.
217I.R.C., sec. 117(a) (11), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 150(b). The capi-
tal losses do not include short-term capital losses being carried over to the
taxable year from prior taxable years.
-1SI.R.C., sec. 117(e) (1), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 150(c).
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capital losses were, however, deductible only to the extent of short-
term capital gains, the excess constituting the basis for the net
short-term loss carry-over.2 1  The limits on the deductibility of
capital losses now apply to the total of such losses, whether they
be short-term or long-term losses.2 0 In the case of corporations,
they are allowed only to the extent of the capital gains, both short-
term and long-term. In the case of other taxpayers it is the same
as for corporations except that it is increased by the amount of
the taxpayer's net income - 1 or $1,000, whichever is the lesser. The
effect of this is to permit non-corporate taxpayers to offset their
capital losses against their ordinary net income to the extent indi-
cated. This limitation is an important factor in the definition of
the "net capital loss." The limitation provision, the definition of
.'net capital loss," and that of "net capital gain" are closely inte-
grated. All contribute to determining the capital gains includible
in income, and the amount of the capital loss carry-over.
The following is an illustration of the last statement. Assume
that A (who reports on the calendar year basis) bad during 1942
a net income of $1,200; capital gains (short-term and long-term)
of $1,100;2'- and capital losses (short-term and long-term) of
$1,500. A's net capital gain equals $1,100 (his capital gains), plus
$1,000 (taken because his net income -2 2 3 is in excess of $1,000),
minus $1,500 (his capital losses), which equals $600. This amount
is includible in his gross income. The amount of his capital losses
which he can deduct equals $1,100 (his capital gains), plus $1,000
(taken because his net income is greater), which equals $2,100.
Hence his entire capital losses are deductible. This is as if $1,000
had been set off against his net income (leaving $200 net income
not so offset) and the remaining $500 of the losses had been set
off against the $1,100 capital gains (leaving $600 not needed as an
amount against which to apply his capital losses). That $600 is
precisely the amount of his net capital gain under the statutory
definition. A's net capital loss equals $1,500 (his capital losses)
minus $1,500 (the amount of his deductible capital losses). Hence
he has no net capital loss, and will not come within the capital loss
2l"See I.R.C., sec. 117(d), (e).
L""I.R.C., sec. 117(d), as amended by R.A. 1942, see. 150(c).
2"That net income is to be computed without regard to capital gains or
capital losses.
222The capital gain and loss figures represent amounts after applying
the percentages that define the extent of their recognition under I.R.C., sec.
117(b), as amerded.
*"'Computed as set forth in footnote 221.
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carry-over provision. Had A's capital losses been $2,100, his net
capital gain would have been zero; the entire -amount of such
losses would have exhausted the limits on their deductibility, and
he would still have no capital loss and so no carry-over. Had they
been $2,200, his net capital gain would have been-$100, the
amount of his capital loss deduction would have been $2,100, and
he would have had a net capital loss of $100, and thus a capital
loss carry-over of $100. These examples suffice to show the inter-
relations between, and the functions of, the concepts mentioned
in the last part of the preceding paragraph.
One method long used for benefiting taxpayers with capital
losses has been to permit those not offset against income (or a
particular type of income) to be carried forward as a deduction in
a subsequent taxable year or years. The prior law employed this
device for net short-term capital losses only.2 24 It was unnecessary
to use it for net long-term capital losses since that law imposed
no limit on their deductibility. Since the amended law imposes
the limit on total capital losses (long-term as well as short-term),
the carry-over provision is now extended to the net capital loss,
regardless of whether it is wholly, in part, or not at all, a short-
term capital loss.2 25 Every net capital loss, regardless of the char-
acter of the losses that have contributed to its existence, is a short-
term capital loss in any year to which any part thereof may be
carried over. The maximum number of subsequent taxable years
to which any part of it may be carried over is five. These years
must be successive, and the first of them is that immediately fol-
lowing that in which the net capital loss occurred. The amount
that can be carried over to any one of such five years equals the
total net capital loss minus the sum of the net capital gains during
the years intervening between that in which the loss occurred and
that to which any part of such loss is to be carried over. The fol-
lowing illustration will help to clarify the meaning of this formula.
Assume that A (who reports on a calendar year basis) had a net
capital loss during 1942 of $5,000; that his net capital gains were
$1,000 for 1943, $2,000 for 1944, $1,500 for 1945, and $1,000 for
1947; and that he had a net capital loss and no net capital gain
for 1946. The amount of capital loss carry-over into 1943 equals
$5,000. However but $1.000 thereof can be absorbed during that
year since the net capital gain for 1943 was only $1,000. The
224I.R.C., sec. 117(e).
22 5.R.C., sec. 117(e), as amended by R. A. 1942, see. 150(c).
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amount carried over to 1944 equals $5,000 (the net capital loss for
1942) minus $1,000 (the net capital gain for 1943), or $4,000, of
which but $2,000 can be carried over to 1944. In the same manner
the carry-over to 1945 is $5,000-($1,000+$2,000) or $2,000, of
which but $1,500 can be used. There is no amount that can be
carried over into 1946 since there is no net capital gain for that
year. The amount of the carry-over into 1947 is $5,000--($1,000+
$2,000+$1,500) or $500. Thus the whole 1942 net capital loss has
been in effect set off against the net capital gains for the succeed-
ing five taxable years. It should be noted that in computing the
net capital gain for any taxable year after 1942 the net capital loss
being carried forward is disregarded as are the net capital losses
arising in any of the intervening years. That is, in computing the
net capital gain for 1944 the $2,000 of the 1942 net capital loss
allocable to it, and any net capital loss arising during 1943 (had
there been such) would be disregarded.2 26
A prior method for granting relief to taxpayers having capi-
tal gains was to provide alternative methods of taxation in such
cases. The prior law provided such methods for non-corporate
taxpayers only, and then only if they had either a net long-term
capital gain or a net long-term capital loss.2-7 This has been
greatly changed. -2 2 " The new relief measure applies to both cor-
porate and non-corporate taxpayers. It is available only if for
the taxable year the taxpayer's net long-term capital gain exceeds
his net short-term capital loss. The alternative tax is determined
as follows. A partial tax is computed on the taxpayer's net income
reduced by the aforementioned excess. This is computed at the
rates and in the manner that the tax would have been computed
but for this relief provision. The tax payable equals such partial
tax plus 25 per cent of said excess in the case of corporations,
or plus 50 per cent thereof in the case of all other taxpayers. 29
-
2
'For a special rule for the treatment of a net short-term capital loss
of the last taxable year beginning in 1941, see I.R.C., sec. 117(e) (2), added
by R. A. 150(c). It treats such loss as a short-term capital loss for the
succeeding taxable year, subject to certain specified limitations. This is to
preserve for the taxpayer some benefit to compensate for the loss of his
right to treat it as a net short-term capital loss carry-over resulting from
the amendment of I.R.C., sec. 117(e).
227I.R.C., sec. 117(c).
""1I.R.C., sec. 117(c), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 150(c).
-
22"Amendmcnts were made to various other sections of the I.R.C. to
reflect these changes in section 117. See I.R.C., sec. 169, as amended by R.
A. 1942, sec. 150(f); I.R.C., sec. 182, as amended by R. A. 1942, sec.
150(g) (1) ; I.R.C., sec. 183, as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 150(g) (2) ;
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Gain and Loss Basis
There have been few changes of general interest in this part
of the law. There has been added one new provision defining a
transfer of property on which no loss is recognized to the trans-
feror. It is limited to transfers in connection with railroad re-
organizations. 230 This has required an addition to the I.R.C. to
provide that the transferee corporation shall take the transferor's
basis with respect to the property transferred in this type of
tax-free reorganization.2 31 A change has also been made in the
provision dealing with involuntary conversions of p r o p e r ty.
Whereas formerly neither gain nor loss was recognized in these
cases (except that gain was recognized in an amount not in excess
of the money not expended in certain specified ways), now no
gain is recognized but a loss is, and the principle defining the ex-
tent to which gain is recognized is made applicable regardless of
whether the money received (and not spent in specified ways) is
received in one or more taxable years or whether it constitutes
gain. 2 3
2
The remaining amendments involve changes in the gain or loss
basis, or in adjustments thereto. The provision relating to the
loss basis for property acquired by gift after December 31, 1920,
has been slightly amended. Under prior law it was the basis of
the donor or last preceding owner who did not acquire it by gift,
or the fair market value of the property at the time of the gift,
whichever was the lower. Now said fair market value becomes
the loss basis only if it is less than the basis of the donor or last
preceding owner not acquiring it by gift, adjusted for the period
prior to the date of the gift in accordance with the provisions of
Section 113(b) of the I.R.C.23 3 Another amendment changes the
provision defining the basis for property acquired after December
31, 1920, by a transfer in trust. It had been held that the former
provision applied even to donative transfers in trust."34 The result
of that decision was to make the alternative loss basis for gifts in-
I.R.C., sec. 336, as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 150(h) ; and I.R.C. sec. 505.
as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 150(i). All deal with adjustments of the
treatment of capital gains and losses for special classes of taxpayers.
230I.R.C., sec. 112(b) (9), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 142(a).
231I.R.C., sec. 113(a) (20), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 142(b). Sec
also I.R.C., sec. 113(a) (21), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 142(c).
2321.R.C., sec 112(f), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 151(d), (e). In
connection with the latter amendment, see Wilmore S. S. Co., Inc. v. Com'r
of Int. Revenue, (1935) 78 Fed. (2d) 667.
-33I.R.C., sec. 113(a) (2), as amended by R.A. 1942, sec. 143(a).
-3Com'r of Int. Revenue, (1941) 122 Fe-1. (2d) 915.
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applicable to property acquired after December 31, 1920, by a
donative transfer in trust. This has now been changed by ex-
cepting such donative transfers in trust from this provision of the
I.R.C. -'" They are, therefore, now subject to the rule applicable
to property acquired by gift after December 31, 1920. The last
change of general importance, that has not already been con-
sidered,2" relates to the basis for property transmitted to the tax-
payer as a result of the death of another person. The basis under
the prior law was the fair market value at the time of acquisition,
which meant the date of the death of the person from whom it
had been acquired.'7 However, under the Federal Estate Tax
Act, the decedent's estate may value his gross estate either on that
basis or, at the executor's election, as of a date one year there-
after." " The amended provision relating to the basis of property
transmitted at death requires that, if the executor elects to have
the gross estate of a decedent valued as of such later date, the
gain and loss basis of property, transmitted from the decedent by
reason of his death, shall be its value on said optional valuation
date.'- '  This amendment applies only with respect to property
includible in the gross estate of a decedent dying after October 21,
1942.'1'"
Dividends
The prior law treated the gain realized by a shareholder from
distributions in partial liquidation of a corporation as a short-term
capital gain, while treating the gain realized from a distribution in
complete liquidation as a long-term capital gain.24' The provision
embodying those rules has been eliminated by the new definition
of "distributions in liquidation.1 24 2 The effect of this change is
that the short-term or long-term character of such gains now de-
pend upon the holding period of the shares with respect to which
the distributions were made.
243
2 5I.R.C., sec. 113(a) (3), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 143(b).
"-F6'or adjustments to the basis with respect to taxes and carrying
charges capitalized, see pp. 262-266, supra; with respect to the amount of
amortizable bond premium, see p. 260, supra; and with respect to im-
provements by lessee, see p. 252.
2a7Helvering v. Reynolds, (1941) 313 U. S. 428, 61 S. Ct. 971, 85 L. Ed.
1438.
-": I.R.C., sec. 811(j).
";1"I.R.C., sec. 113(a) (5), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 144(a).
U1°R. A. 1942, sec. 144(b).
2-1I.R.C., sec. 115(c).
"XI.R.C., sec. 115(c), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 147.24
'An amendment has also been made to I.R.C., sec. 115(1) (relating
to the computation for corporate earnings and profits available for dividends)
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Credits Against Net Income
The credits which an individual may take against his net in-
come are divisible into (1) those available in computing his
normal-tax net income only, and (2) those available in computing
both his normal-tax net income and his surtax net income.2 "' The
only change made in the former is that it is now expressly provided
that the credit for interest on obligations of the United States in-
cludes the interest on such obligations only if, under the Act au-
thorizing the issue of such obligations, as amended and supple-
mented, such interest is exempt from normal tax.21' This appears
to be merely declaratory of the prior law. The principal changes
in the credits available for both normal and surtax computations
were made in the personal exemption and the credit for de-
pendents. The personal exemptions are now as follows :21" (a) in
the case of a single person or a married person not living with
husband or wife, $500; and (b) in the case of the head of a family
or a married person living with husband or wife, $1,200. If a
husband and wife living together make separate returns, their
combined exemption is still $1,200, which may be taken by either
or divided between them. The only change in this respect is the
elimination of the former provision limiting the one spouse to a
personal exemption of $750 (the total for both was $1,500) if the
other filed a return under the optional tax provisions217 This was
eliminated because those provisions have been amended to deny
one spouse the right to compute his tax on that basis if the other
spouse makes his return and computes his tax on the regular
basis . 2 1 The only change in the credit for dependents is its re-
duction from $400 to $350.14 9 It is also provided that payments
made to a divorced wife which are now includible in her income
shall not be deemed payments for the support of a dependent-5"
disallowing losses on wash sales in computing such earnings or profits
(R.A. 1942, sec. 146(a)). The amendment is applicable to taxable years
beginning after December 31, 1938 (R.A. 1942, sec. 146(b)).
2 I.R.C., sec. 25.
245I.R.C., sec. 25(a) (1), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 112(b). The
amendme!nt is effective as of March 1, 1941 (R.A. 1942, sec. 112(c)).2 6I.R.C., sec. 25(b) (1), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 131(a).
247See I.R.C., sec. 25(b) (1).
24I.R.C., sec. 404, as amended by R. A. 1942, see. 104(c).
2491.R.C., sec. 25(b) (2) (A), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 131(b).
-2oI.R.C., sec. 25(b) (2) (A), as amended by R. A. 1942 sec. 120(e).
The changes in credits required the amendment of certain other sections of
the I.R.C., such as those relating to the credits of nonresident aliens and
citizens of possessions of the United States, and sections governing the duty
to make returns (See for these, R. A. 1942, sec. 131).
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The two principal changes in the credits of corporations
against net income are as follows: (1) the addition of a credit for
the amount of net income subject to the excess profits tax ;251 and
(2) changing the limit on the dividends received credit from 85
per cent of the adjusted net income to 85 per cent thereof after its
reduction by the amount of the credit referred to in (1).2 52 The
other changes are with respect to credits that relate to special
classes of taxable corporations .
2 5
The Optional Tax
The optional tax is a tax imposed on individuals in lieu of the
regular normal and surtax. It is in substance an adjusted gross
income tax. It was introduced into the federal income tax system
by the Revenue Act of 1941. It is optional with the taxpayer en-
titled to use it. The group so entitled includes individuals only.
There are several factors that condition inclusion therein. The
method may be used only by taxpayers whose gross income
(which means the same thing as in the case of any other individ-
ual) is not in excess of $3000, and then only if such income con-
sists wholly of income from salary, wages, compensation for per-
sonal services, dividends, interest or annuities.2 5 4 The amendment
made by R. A. 1942 eliminated rent and royalties from the income
which those entitled to select this method of taxation might re-
ceive. The taxpayer's taxable year and his method of reporting
also affect his right to use it. It is available only to one whose
taxable year is the calendar year and who makes his return on
the cash basis. 2 5 There have been several additions to those who
are expressly made ineligible to use it. The prior law excluded
non-resident aliens, and estates and trusts. There have been
added to that group an individual filing a return for less than 12
months, one filing a return on a fiscal year basis, and a married
individual, living with husband or wife at any time during the
taxable year, whose spouse files a return and computes a tax with-
out regard to this method.2 51 Under prior law such married per-
"'
5 1.R.C., seL. 26(e), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 105(d).
","I.R.C.. sec. 26(b), as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 105(e).
"See as to net operating loss credit, I.R.C., sec. 26(c), as amended by
R. A. 1942, sec. 132(a); the dividends paid credit, I.R.C., sec. 27, as
amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 132(b), (c) ; the consent dividend credit,
I.R.C.. sec. 28, as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 186(e) ; and as to credit for
dividends paid on public utility preferred stock, I.R.C., sec. 26(h), added by
R. A. 1942. sec. 133.
25I.R.C., sec. 400, as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 104(a).
2 .I.R.C., secs. 400 and 404, as amended by R. A. 1942. sec. 104(a). (c).
"-'r"'!.R.C., sec. 401. as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 104(b).
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son was permitted to use it even though the other spouse did not.
The only result of the fact that both did not use it was that the
personal exemption of the one not using it was reduced to half of
the exemption accorded a married person living with husband or
wife.
The schedule of taxes payable appears as part of Section 400
of the I.R.C. This also provides a $385 credit for each dependent
instead of $400 as formerly. A person entitled to this credit must
subtract from his gross income $385 for each dependent in order
to determine the line in the tax schedule in which the amount of
his tax will be found. If, for example, A is a married person whose
spouse has no gross income (or a married person making a joint
return, or the head of a family) with two dependents, and having
a gross income from proper sources of $2,850, he would subtract
2 x $385 or $770 from $2,850. This would give him a gross in-
come of $2,080 for purposes of applying the tax schedule. The
line in which his tax will be found is that reading "If the gross
income is over $2,075 but not over $2,100." That shows his tax
to be $133 (the third, column specifying the amount that the tax
shall be).
The application of the tax schedule depends upon whether the
taxpayer is a single person who is not the head of a family, a
married person living with husband or wife, a married person
not living with husband or wife, or the head of a family, and also
upon whether he has any dependents. The definition of these
terms under the prior law was the same as applied in the computa-
tion of the regular income tax. This has now been changed.2e a The
status of a taxpayer is no longer determined as of the last day of
his taxable year but as of July 1 of the taxable year. Thus a per-
son is a "married person" if living with husband or wife on July
1 of the taxable year, and a single person, even though married, if
not living with husband or wife on such July 1. The fact of
dependency is also determined as of that date. The definition of a
"dependent" is in all other respects the same as with respect
to the regular income tax.
A taxpayer is entitled to make an election to be taxed by this
method for each taxable year. But an election once made for a
given taxable year is irrevocable. Furthermore, if he has filed a
return on the regular basis for any taxable year, he has made an
election for that year and may not thereafter elect to be taxed by
2t6aI.R.C., sec. 401, as amended by R. A. 1942, sec. 104(b).
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the optional tax method. 257 There has been no change with respect
to these matters. The provision that no credits are allowable
against the optional tax for foreign income and profits taxes and
taxes withheld at the source has also been left as before.
258
The Victory Tax
This is a wholly new tax all of whose provisions are added to
the I.R.C. by section 172 (a) of R. A. 1942.159 The tax is equal to
5 per cent of the "victory tax net income" of every individual,
other than a non-resident alien taxable under section 211 (a) of
the I.R.C.2 1 It is also imposed upon estates and trusts, but not
upon corporations. A limit is put on the amount of the tax. That
will be subsequently discussed.
The starting point for computing the victory tax net income
is the same gross income that the taxpayer would report for
regular income tax purposes. 26 ' This must be reduced by exclud-
ing three items that are includible in the regular gross income.
262
These are (1) capital gains as defined in Section 117 of the I.R.C.;
(2) the interest on obligations of the United States or its instru -
mentalities which constitutes a credit against net income for
normal tax purposes; and (3) the amount received as compensa-
tion for injury or sickness which has been included in gross income
because attributable to medical expense deductions during prior
years.2"' The victory tax net income is the excess of this adjusted
gross income over the sum of certain specified deductions. 264 The
business and non-business expenses are deductible under the same
circumstances and to the same extent as in computing the regular
income tax. Interest is deductible only on indebtedness incurred
in carrying on a business, for producing or collecting income,
or for managing, conserving or maintaining property held for the
production of income. The same restriction applies to the deduc-
27I.R.C., see. 402.
2514.R.C., sec. 403.
25f'Other subsections of R. A. 1942, sec. 172, make various amendments
to other provisions of the I.R.C. which are not of sufficient importance for
present purposes to warrant their treatment in this article.
-,.R.C., sec. 450, added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172 (a). Section 211(a)
deals with the taxation of non-resident aliens not engaged in business within
the United States.
2,tThe phrase "regular income tax" is used in this discussion of the
victory tax to designate the tax imposed by sections 11 and 12 of the I.R.C.
upon individuals. The term "regular gross income" is used to designate the
gross income used in computing the "regular income tax."
.. 2I.R.C., sec. 451 (a), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a).
2'11See as to this third item p. 273, supra.
.-AqR.C., sec. 451 (a), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a).
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tion of taxes. Losses and bad debts are deductible only if incurred
in connection with the taxpayer's trade or business.' " The deduc-
tions for depreciation, depletion, contributions to pension trusts,
the amortization of emergency facilities, and for net operating
losses may be taken in the same manner and to the same extent
as in computing the regular income tax. The principle underlying
these deductions is to limit them to items of the stated descriptions
that are related to business and other income producing activities.
The only two permissible deductions that fall outside of that
principle are deductible alimony payments, and charitable contribu-
tions in the case of estates or trusts and in the case of an individual
permitted to take that deduction not subject to the usual 15 per
cent limitation thereon.2 66 All deductions are subject to the limita-
tions contained in Section 24 of the I.R.C., and in Supplements J
and H thereof.2 67 The foregoing discussion has no application to
a taxpayer computing his tax under the optional tax method. His
victory tax net income for any taxable year when he uses that
method is his gross income for that year.268 In the case of a mem-
ber of a partnership, he is required to include in computing his
victory tax net income, so far as that depends upon the partner-
ship income, his distributive share of the partnership's ordinary
net income or ordinary net loss. 69
The victory tax is computed upon the amount of the victory
tax net income reduced by the amount of a specific exemption of
$624 for each taxpayer..2 70 A special rule applies where a husband
and wife file a joint return and the victory tax net income of one
of them is less than $624. In that case the aggregate exemption
of both the spouses is limited to $624 plus the victory tax net
income of the spouse whose victory tax net income is less than
$624. For example, if the victory tax net income of the husband
is $4,000 and that of his wife is $100, and if they file a joint
return, the credit which they may take against their combined
265The basis for determining the amount of a loss and a bad debt de-
duction is the adjusted basis for determining the loss from the sale or other
disposition of property under I.R.C., sec. 113(b) (I.R.C., sec. 451(d), added
by R.A. 1942, sec. 172(a)).2 6rSee I.R.C., sec. 121).
2671.R.C., sec. 451(b), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a). I.R.C., sec. 24
relates to non-deductible items; Supplement J, to citizens of possessions of
the United States; and Supplement H to non-resident aliens.218I.R.C., sec. 451(c), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a).
269I.R.C., see. 451(b), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a). As to compu-
tation of the victory tax net income of participants in a common trust fund,
see I.R.C., sec. 451(e), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a).
270I.R.C., sec. 452, added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a).
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victory tax net income of $4,100 is $724. The tax would thus
be based on $3,376. That is exactly the amount that would have
been subjected to the victory tax had separate returns been filed.
This provision is intended to prevent crediting against the victory
tax net income of one spouse that part of the credit available to
the other spouse which he or she cannot use because of a deficiency
in victory tax net income. It will prevent resort to joint returns
solely to reduce the tax of the spouse whose victory tax net income
exceeds $624.
The victory tax will constitute a compulsory loan with respect
to such part thereof as is to be refunded or credited to the tax-
paver after the cessation of hostilities in the present war. This
is the effect of the system of post-war refunds and credits provided
for by the Act.271 The amount of such refund or credit depends
upon the status of the taxpayer during the taxable year. The
amounts are as follows: (1) if the taxpayer is a single person or
married person not living with husband or wife, 25 per cent of
the victory tax or $500, whichever is the lesser; (2) if he is the
head of a family, 40 per cent of the victory tax or $1,000, which-
ever is the lesser; (3) if he (or she) is a married person living
with wife (or husband) and separate returns are filed, 40 per cent
of the victory tax or $500, whichever is the lesser; (4) in the case
of such a married person as is described in (3), if a separate
return is filed by one spouse and no return is filed by the other,
or if a joint return is filed, 40 per cent of the victory tax or $1,000,
whichever is the lesser; and (5) an additional 2 per cent of the
victory tax or $100, whichever is the lesser, for each dependent,
defined in the same manner as for purposes of computing the regu-
lar tax or optional tax. In the case of a change of marital status,
or of status with respect to dependents, during the taxable year,
the amount of the refund is apportioned on a time basis, disre-
garding fractions of a month unless in excess of a half a month in
which case they count as a month.2 7- The following examples illus-
trates the meaning of the preceding sentence. (1) Assume that A
is a single person from January 1 until July 5 of his taxable year
(taken to be the calendar year), and a married person living with
his wife for the remainder thereof; that his victory tax is $200;
and that his wife has no victory tax net income. His refund or
credit will be 1/., of $50 (the amount had he been a single person
during the whole of the taxable year) plus /2 of $80 (the amount
2711.R.C., sec. 454(a), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a)
2721.R.C., sec. 454(b), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a).
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had he been a married person living with his wife during the
whole of said year). That is, his refund or credit for that year
will be $65. (2) Assume that A is married and living with his
wife during the whole of a taxable year, and the birth of a child
to them on Sept. 3 of that year; that he files a return for that year
and that his wife files no return; and that his victory tax is $200.
His credit or refund will be $80 (due to his marital status) plus
% 2ths of $4 (the amount he would have been entitled to had the
dependent been such during the whole of the taxable year). That
is, his refund or credit -will be $81.25. The foregoing discussion
does not apply to a taxpayer computing his regular tax by the
optional tax method. His marital status, and his status with
respect to dependents, is determined by conditions as of July 1
of the taxable year, and no apportionment formula is required to
compute the amount of his refund or credit.17 3 It should be noted
that taxpayers will have to apply for their refunds or credits
after the war. They are not made automatically.
27 4
There are certain conditions under which a taxpayer may apply
the amount to which he would be entitled as a post-war refund
or credit against his current victory tax.2 75 The amount of this
current credit is the sum of three differefit items. The first con-
sists of amounts paid during the taxable year as life insurance
premiums on policies in force on September 1, 1942. The insur-
ance must be upon either his own life, that of his spouse, or that
of a dependent with respect to whom he is entitled to a credit
in computing his regular income tax. There may also be included
premiums on life insurance which is a renewal or conversion of
insurance in force on September 1, 1942, to the extent that such
premiums do not exceed the premiums payable on such insurance
in force on said date. In other words, the premiums on policies
not in force on that date constitute no part of this credit.
The second item in the computation of the current credit against
the tax is defined as "The amount by which the smallest amount
of indebtedness of the taxpayer outstanding at any time during
the period beginning September 1, 1942, and ending with the
close of the preceding taxable year, exceeds the amount of in-
debtedness, of the taxpayer outstanding at the close of the taxable
year." The basis for it is not the mere payment of indebtedness.
but the net reduction of the taxpayer's indebtedness, during the
-73I.R.C., sec. 454(c), added by R. A. 1942, see. 172(a).
2741.R.C., sec. 454(d), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a).
2751.R.C., sec. 453, added by R. A. 1942, see. 172(a).
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taxable year against whose victory tax he wishes to take this
credit, the September 1, 1942, indebtedness being the starting
point. The following example may clarify this provision. Assume
that A reports on a calendar year basis; and that the record of his
debt position from September 1, 1942, until December 31, 1944,
was as follows:
(1) Amount of his indebtedness at 9/1/42 ............................ $5,000
(2) Amount thereof paid on 12/1/42 .................................... 1,000
(3) Amount of new indebtedness incurred on June 1, 1943.. 2,000
(4) Amount of indebtedness paid off on October 1, 1943 ... 1,500
(5) Amount of indebtedness paid off during 1944 .............  1,700
The amount of this credit for 1943 would be computed as follows:
(1) the smallest amount of A's indebtedness outstanding during
the period beginning with September 1, 1942, and the close of his
1942 taxable year equals $4,000; (2) the amount of his indebted-
ness at the close of his taxable year 1943 equals $4,500; (3) the
excess of (1) over (2) equals -$500; (4) hence, he is entitled to
no such credit for 1943. The amount of this credit for 1944 would
be computed as follows: (5) the smallest amount of A's indebted-
ness during the period beginning September 1, 1942, and ending
at the close of his taxable year 1943 equals $4,000; (6) the amount
of his indebtedness outstanding at the end of his taxable year
1944 equals $2,800; (7) the excess of (5) over (6) equals $1,200,
which is the amount of his credit for 1944. Although he has
paid off $3,200 on his indebtedness since the victory tax went
into effect, $2,000 of it was applied against debts incurred after
December 31, 1942, leaving but $1,200 to apply against debts
incurred prior to January 1, 1943. A variation of the second
case is interesting. Assume that A had paid $1,500 on his indebted-
ness on June 1, 1943, and borrowed the $2,000 on October 1, 1943.
Then the computation would be as follows: (8) the smallest
amount of his debt between September 1, 1942, and December 31,
1943, would equal $2,500; (9) the amount of his indebtedness on
December 31, 1944. would still be $2,800; but (10) the excess of (8)
over (9) would now be -$200, that is, non-existent. Hence A would
be entitled to no credit for 1944. The $1,500 paid by him during
1943 is in effect applied against his September 1, 1942, irdebted-
ness, and he is penalized for incurring indebtedness after such
repayment. The relative order of debt reductions and increases
after December 31, 1942, is thus an important factor in deter-
mining the extent of this credit. The method of its computation
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operates as a deterrent to increasing one's indebtedness after once
having reduced it.
The last item in computing the current credit against the tax
is based on the purchase of obligations of the United States. The
credit for any taxable year is defined as "The amount by which the
amount of the obligations of the United States owned by the tax-
payer on the last day of the taxable year exceeds the greater of
(A) the amount of such obligations owned by the taxpayer on
December 31, 1942, or (B) the highest amount of such obligations
owned by the taxpayer on the last day of any preceding taxable
year ending after December 31, 1942." It will be seen from this
that the basis of the credit is not the amount of such obligations
purchased during the taxable year, but the net increase in the tax-
payer's holdings measured from the higher of two alternative
figures reflecting holdings at the end of 1942 or the end of any
taxable year ending thereafter. The following example illustrates
the meaning of this provision. Assume that A reports on the
calendar year basis, and that his holdings of the proper types of
obligations of the United States are represented by the following
schedule:
(1) Owned on December 31, 1942 ................. .................. $5,000
(2) Owned on December 31, 1943 ........................................ 7.000
(3) Owned on December 31, 1944 ................... 8,000
(4) Owned on December 31, 1945 ....................... 7,500
(5) Owned on December 31, 1946 ........................................ 9,000
On the basis of these figures his credit for 1943 will be $2,000; for
1944, $1,000 (the excess over his holdings on December 31, 1944,
over his holdings on December 31, 1943, since the latter is greater
than his holdings on-December 31, 1942) ; for 1945, no credit since
his holdings at the end of that year are not in excess of $8,000
(the highest amount at the end of any taxable year ending after
December 31, 1942, which is taken as the basis of computation
because it is greater than his holdings on the date last mentioned) ;
and for 1946, $1,000 (the excess of his holdings at the end of 1946
over his holdings at the end of 1944, when his holdings were
greater than at December 31, 1942, and the highest amount of his
year end holdings for any taxable year ending after the last
mentioned date) .276 The device employed for measuring the
amount of this credit penalizes any transfers of such obligations
2 76The illustration assumes that the victory tax will still be in effect
during 1946.
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that are not offset by the purchase of other such obligations in an
equal amount. This was one of its purposes.
For the purpose of applying the formula discussed in the pre-
ceding paragraph a taxpayer is deemed to own the amount owned
solely by him, and one-half of the amount owned jointly by him
and one other person. He may not include in his holdings the
amount of any such obligations acquired by any other method
than purchase. The amount of his holdings equals the amount
paid by him therefor, not their par or redemption value. The
statute does not specify which obligations of the United States
may enter into the computation of this credit. It defines them as
such obligations of the United States as the Secretary of the
Treasury "may by regulations prescribe, and as are purchased in
such manner and under such terms and conditions as he may
specify." This discretionary power might be exercised to exclude
obligations available for the payment of federal income taxes, or
those purchased on the installment plan, or those whose purchase
was financed by borrowing or from the proceeds of -the sale of
obligations of the United States issued prior to some given date.
Taxpayers will have to familiarize themselves with these regula-
tions if, as, and when they are issued.
The current credit available is the sum of the three items just
discussed. Its amount is, however, subject to a limitation.2 7 7 It
may not exceed the amount of the taxpayer's post-war refund or
credit with respect to the same taxable year, -"7 but this refers to
such refund or credit computed without regard to the limitation
imposed on it. The reason for this qualification is that the post-
war refund or credit is to be reduced by the amount of the current
credit.2 7' The sum of the current credit and the post-war refund
or credit with respect to any taxable year may not exceed the
percentages of the victory tax for that year which have already
been discussed. 2.
There is also a limit imposed upon the amount of the victory
tax for any taxable year. -281 The total tax (computed without
regard to the current credit, the post-war refund or credit, and
the credit for victory tax collected at the source) shall not exceed
the excess of 90 per cent of the taxpayer's net income for the tax-
2771.R.C., sec. 453(b), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a).
27 See pp. 289, 290.
2-9I.R.C., sec. 254(e), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a).
2,See pp. 289, 290.
slI.R.C., sec. 456, added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
able year over the normal and surtax imposed thereon (computed
without regard to the credits against said income taxes for foreign
income and profits taxes, for ordinary income taxes collected at
the source, and for the excess of the victory tax collected at the
source over the victory tax, less the current credit, due from the
taxpayer). Assume that A's net income for 1943 is $1,000,000;
that he is a single person without dependents; that he has no
interest income that can be used as a credit for normal tax pur-
poses; that his earned net income is in excess of $14,000; that his
victory tax net income in excess of $624 is $1,100,000. On the
basis of these figures his normal tax and surtax would be
$854,616. His victory tax would be $55,000. The sum of these
taxes would be $909,616. 90 per cent of his net income is
$900,000. His victory tax would be subject to the limitation now
being considered. It would be computed as follows: (1) 90 per
cent of his net income equals $900,000; (2) his normal tax and
surtax equal $854,616; (3) the excess of (1) over (2) equals
$45,384, which is the amount of his victory tax. This is in effect
limiting the aggregate amount of his normal tax, his surtax, and
his victory tax to 90 per cent of his net income as calculated for
purposes of computing his normal tax and his surtax. It is ap-
parent that the limit will operate in relatively few cases.
The fact that the victory tax is collected at the source so far as
the taxpayer's income is derived from wages gives rise to another
credit problem. There are likely to be many cases in which the
amount of the victory tax collected at the source exceeds the total
victory tax due from the taxpayer entitled to take, and who does
take, what has been called the current credit against that tax.
Assume that A derives all but $1,000 of his 1943 income from
wages, and that his wages (which includes salary) for that year
were $5,624. His total victory tax for 1943 would then be $300,
of which his employer will have withheld and paid $250. Assume
that A, married man living with his wife for the whole of 1943,
purchased $500 worth of the proper kind of obligations of the
United States. This is in excess of 40 per cent of his victory tax
which would be $120. Hence he is entitled to a current credit
against his victory tax of $120, leaving the tax due and payable
$180. But his employer has already deducted from his salary,
and paid over to the United States, $250 on account of victory
tax for 1943. Hence A has overpaid his victory tax by $70.
He may apply this against the income taxes due from him with
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respect to his 1943 income, whether he has computed that by the
regular method or by the optional tax method. If such income
taxes are less than $70, he is entitled to a refund.28 2
The provisions for the collection of the victory tax at the
source are extremely long. They will not be discussed. The foot-
note gives the references to the most important provisions relating
thereto.2
-1
3
The victory tax is intended to be a temporary tax. It is not to
apply to any taxable year commencing after the date of the cessa-
tion of hostilities in the present war as fixed by Presidential
proclamation.2 s
4
Returns
Attention is directed to the fact that an individual taxpayer is
no longer required to s-wear to his return. The return must, how-
ever, contain or be verified by a written statement that it is made
under the penalties of perjury.2 5
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion has selected those particular provi-
sions of the Revenue Act of 1942 that were deemed likely to be
of general interest to the greatest' number of those required to
handle federal tax problems. No attempt has been made to con-
sider procedural changes, though some of these are of considerable
importance. '" It would take a volume to explain all of the amend-
ments to the I.R.C. with that degree of detail necessary to make
the discussion valuable. It is hoped that the general practitioner
will find the writer's selection of points for discussion conforming
to his needs.
2"I.R.C., see. 466(e), (f), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a). The
statements in the text may be made obsolete if some form of the Ruml plan
is adopted and applied to 1943.2' I.R.C., secs. 465-470, added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a).
2s1I.R.C., secs. 475, 476, added by R. A. 1942, sec. 172(a).
L I.R.C., sec. 51, as amended by R. A. 1942, see. 136(a).
23See particularly I.R.C., see. 3772(d), added by R. A. 1942, sec. 503(this deals with the effect of a suit against a collector as a bar to other
suits) ; and I.R.C., sec. 3804, added by R. A. 1942, sec. 507 (this relates to
the postponement, by reason of the war, of certain acts required to be done
under the I.R.C.).
